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WELL-BEING, INEQUALITY AND TIME:
THE TIME-SLICE PROBLEM AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Probably no topic has been more central to legal scholarship than inequality. But
one aspect of the problem has been insufficiently discussed. This is the question of the
time-slice. Should egalitarians be concerned with the inequality of individuals’ wellbeing or resources over their lifetimes, or with inequality during what I shall
“sublifetimes,” such as annual or even momentary inequality?
This Article engages the time-slice problem, and does so from the perspective of
welfarism. In other words, I assume that the “currency” for equality is human well-
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being,2 and then ask whether the legal system should aim to secure the equality of
individual lifetime or sublifetime well-being. My conclusion is that the lifetime view is
more attractive.
Part I of the Article summarizes the welfarist framework for thinking about
problems of policy choice. Among other things, it explains my reasons for addressing the
time-slice problem from a welfarist rather than extra-welfarist perspective.
In short: the concept of “well-being” is an inclusive one, potentially encompassing a
range of objective goods or aspects of human flourishing, and not merely preference
satisfaction. Further, welfarists need not be utilitarians. The formalism of an “equityregarding social welfare function” provides a tool for thinking about law and policy
which is analytically rigorous and sensitive to distributional considerations.
Part II defends the lifetime view. The time-slice problem, while generally
overlooked by legal scholars, has generated a small body of philosophical scholarship.
Although the dominant view, here, is a lifetime view, a number of dissenters have
advanced important challenges to this position, which I grapple with in Part II.
Specifically, Derek Parfit has presented a deflationary picture of personal identity over
time which, he suggests, supports a sublifetime view. And Dennis McKerlie has argued
that -- quite apart from considerations of personal identity -- there are powerful intuitions
supporting the sublifetime view. Part II responds to McKerlie’s and Parfit’s challenges to
the lifetime view.
The thrust of Part II is that the optimal distributively-sensitive legal rules and
institutions -- within the welfarist framework -- are those identified by the application of
an equity-regarding social welfare function to lifetime rather than sublifetime utilities.
But what, exactly, does that mean given conditions of uncertainty? If the policymaker is
uncertain about the distribution of lifetime utilities, should she aim to equalize the
distribution of expected lifetime well-being, or should she instead focus on the expected
degree of inequality of actual lifetime well-being? Should she care about equality of
expectations (the “ex ante” approach), or about expected inequality (the “ex post”
approach). Drawing on my work with Chris Sanchirico, Part III clarifies the distinction
between the two approaches and summarizes the case for the “ex post” approach.
The upshot of Parts II and III is a framework for thinking about legal rules and
institutions which cares about equality, focuses on lifetime rather than sublifetime wellbeing, and is outfitted for choice under uncertainty. Parts IV and V survey the multiple,
concrete implications of this account. In particular, I discuss what a lifetime view implies
for the measurement of inequality; for the measurement of poverty; for the design of the
tax-and-transfer system; for the contested question whether non-tax instruments, such as
environmental regulations or expenditures on public goods, should ever be used for
redistributive purposes; and (because the answer to this question is, plausibly, yes) for
how policy-analytic tools, such as cost-benefit analysis, should be rendered sensitive to
distributive considerations.
2
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Whether or not the reader is ultimately moved by my arguments in favor of a
lifetime view, this Article should at least persuade her that the choice between lifetime
and sublifetime perspectives --in short, the time-slice problem -- is a vital one for law and
policy. Consider the following examples, discussed (among others) in Parts IV and V.
-- A very large body of work within applied economics applies quantitative
metrics of inequality, such as the so-called Gini coefficient, to the distribution of
income. The bulk of this scholarship attends to the distribution of annual income,
but there are scholars who have tried to measure the inequality of lifetime income,
using longitudinal data, proxies for lifetime income (such as annual consumption),
or simulation models. The upshot of this research is that the distribution of
lifetime income is more equal, both in the U.S. and abroad, than the distribution
of annual income. Further, time trends may look different. For example, the
inequality of annual income has been increasing in the U.S., but the inequality of
lifetime income has not. 3
-- Health economists have followed the lead of the income-inequality scholars,
and have started to measure the population distribution of health or longevity.
Here, too, the lifetime and sublifetime perspectives about the extent or time trend
of inequality can differ.4 For a simple example, imagine an outbreak of a fatal
disease that tends to affect those who are already in chronically bad health. From
a lifetime perspective, the outbreak increases inequality. Those affected by the
disease are, generally, already badly off in terms of lifetime well-being. The
disease lowers the lifetime well-being of this badly off group, by shortening their
lifespans. But, from a sublifetime perspective, the effect of the disease on
inequality is more ambiguous. The outbreak may actually reduce annual or
momentary health inequality, going forward, because those who remain in the
population tend to be in better health.5
-- Tax scholars have long sought to measure the “incidence” of taxes. A tax is
“regressive” if its burden, as a fraction of the taxpayer’s income, tends to decrease
as the taxpayer’s income increases. A tax is “progressive” if its burden tends to
increase as the taxpayer’s income increases. Recent incidence scholarship shows
that the time-slice problem matters critically for evaluating the degree of
regressivity/progressivity of various taxes. Are we asking about the tax burden as
a fraction of annual income or of lifetime income? Sales and excise taxes are,
famously, regressive from a sublifetime perspective, but are much less so from a
lifetime perspective. The personal income tax is progressive from a sublifetime
perspective, but is less progressive from a lifetime perspective.
-- Poverty researchers have begun to examine “chronic” poverty. Traditional
poverty metrics look to whether the individual falls below some periodic or
momentary threshold with respect to some attainment critical to well-being - for
3
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example, whether the individual’s annual income is below the poverty line, or
whether he is badly nourished or lacks shelter at present. Chronic poverty metrics
look to whether the individual repeatedly falls below the periodic threshold, or
whether his long-term attainments fall below some long-term threshold. It turns
out that the determinants of transient and chronic poverty, and the appropriate
policy responses, are quite different. Chronic poverty results from low human
capital and geographic or social isolation. Individuals who experience transient
rather than chronic poverty generally do so because of transitory “shocks” from
which they rebound, such as the loss of a wage-earner in the household, an
economic downturn, or a natural disaster. Policy tools such as unemployment
insurance or disaster relief, which mitigate transient but not chronic poverty, will
tend to look quite attractive from the sublifetime perspective but less so if we care
about lifetime well-being.6
- Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, among others, have argued against using
non-tax instruments for redistributive purposes. The core of the analysis is this:
Whenever the policymaker rejects a policy which has certain “efficiency”
characteristics, on distributive grounds, it will be possible to couple the efficient
policy with changes to the income tax system so that everyone is better off. But
what, exactly, does “efficiency” mean? And how does uncertainty figure into the
argument? If one adopts a lifetime perspective together with an “ex post”
account of choice under uncertainty, one policy is Pareto-superior to another -the second would be rejected by any social welfare function -- only if the first
policy increases everyone’s lifetime well-being in every state of the world. Call
this EP-L Pareto superiority. An “efficient” policy, in turn, is one that can be
transformed into an EP-L Pareto superior policy via the tax system. This is a
demanding criterion which, it seems, few real-world policies will satisfy. Thus,
the Kaplow and Shavell argument turns out to have limited scope.
-- The “suspect class” framework is a useful heuristic for evaluating distributional
impacts. A policy is distributionally problematic, and merits closer scrutiny, if it
discriminates against, or has a disparate impact on, racial minorities, women, and
perhaps other groups. What groups precisely? The specification of suspect
classes implicates the time-slice problem -- because a suspect class is one whose
members tend to be badly off, and one then needs to ask whether that means
“badly off” in lifetime or sublifetime terms. This implication is clearest in the
case of age. From the sublifetime perspective, there is a strong case for thinking
of the aged as a suspect class. Older individuals tend to have poorer health, lower
incomes, fewer friends and pursuits, and so forth. From the lifetime perspective,
that case evaporates or at least becomes much weaker. Absent secular changes in
individuals’ income, health, etc., the distribution of lifetime well-being among
individuals who have reached a point of relatively advanced age (e.g., 85) should
be no different from the distribution of lifetime well-being among individuals
who are now younger but will live to that point. And older individuals will tend
6
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to have a higher level of lifetime well-being than younger individuals who will
die prematurely, before ever reaching that age.
In short, a wide range of real-world questions that egalitarians should care about -questions about how to measure inequality and how to design policies to redress it -- are
enmeshed with the time-slice problem. It is surprising -- deeply puzzling, really -- that
legal scholars have paid the problem so little attention.
I.

EQUITY-REGARDING WELFARISM

This Part sets forth the welfarist account of equality that undergirds the remainder
of the Article. Section A explains what a “social welfare” function (SWF) is, and
distinguishes between three different kinds of equity-regarding SWFs: “prioritarian,”
“comparativist,” and “sufficientist.” Section B explicates the distinction between
lifetime and sublifetime views, within the SWF framework. Section C addresses the
worry that welfarism and the SWF framework is an inadequate basis for thinking about
problems of equality.
A.

Social Welfare Functions (SWFs)

The SWF framework, which is little used by philosophers but is standard within
theoretical welfare economics and certain areas of applied economics and legal
scholarship, works as follows.7 Assume a fixed population of N individuals, each of
whom lives for K periods.8 Each possible outcome is represented by a vector or list of
utilities, representing the lifetime or sublifetime well-being of the individuals in that
outcome. In the case of lifetime welfarism, each possible outcome will be represented as
a vector of N utilities (1 for each lifetime well-being of each of the N individuals). In the
case of sublifetime welfarism, each possible outcome will be represented as a vector of
N×K utilities (1 for the well-being of each of the N individuals during each of the K
stages in her life.) However, let us ignore the distinction between lifetime and
sublifetime utilities for the moment. On both sorts of views, each outcome is
representable as a vector, with an appropriate number of entries, representing individuals’
well-being. To put this formally, there is a utility function u that maps a given outcome
O onto a vector u(O), with N or N×K entries.
An SWF is a mathematical function w which takes the utility vector for each
outcome, and maps it onto a single (scalar) number, representing the social value of that
7
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outcome. w(u(O))>w(u(O*)) if and only if O is a better outcome than O*, where w is the
SWF and u(O) and u(O*) are the utility vectors representing outcomes O and O*,
respectively.
THE SWF FRAMEWORK

Utility
function
u(O)
Outcome
O

Social welfare
function
w(u(O))
Vector of utilities
(u1,…,uM),
where M=N
(lifetime welfarism)
or
M=N×K
(sublifetime
welfarism)

Social value=
w(u1,…,uM)

An SWF can be thought of as a mathematical representation of a welfarist moral
view. A welfarist view offers moral verdicts of a certain sort: verdicts about how well off
different individuals are in different outcomes; and verdicts about how outcomes
compare with each other, which depend solely on the verdicts about individual wellbeing. (This is what makes the view welfarist: its ranking of outcomes and, then,
choices, must be a product solely of well-being information.) The SWF framework
formalizes all this with numbers.
A more precise statement of the correspondence between welfarist moral views
and SWFs is this: A given welfarist moral view corresponds to a set of pairs of utility
functions and social welfare function, {(u1, w1), (u2, w2), … (uL, wL)}, where each ui maps
a given outcome onto a vector of N or N× K utilities, and each wi then maps utility
vectors onto scalars representing the social value of outcomes. The reasons for thinking
of a welfarist moral view as represented by a set of pairs of utility functions and SWFs,
rather than a single such pair, have to do with the nonuniqueness of utility numbers and
the possibility of incommensurability.9 These issues are orthogonal to the time-slice
9

Social choice theorists typically associate a single SWF with a family of utility functions, recognizing that
the given SWF applied to the original utility function or admissible transformations thereof will produce
the same ordering of outcomes. For example, the utilitarian SWF, applied to utility vectors produced from
outcomes using a given u, will produce the same ordering of outcomes if u is multiplied by any positive
constant and any constant is added. The sum of the square root of utilities, a kind of equity-regarding
SWF, will produce the same ordering of outcomes if u is multiplied by a positive constant.
My suggestion that a given welfarist moral view might correspond to a set of SWFs (each paired
with a corresponding utility function), rather than a single SWF, is a natural extension of the basic idea that
utility functions and SWFs are mathematical representations of a moral view and that such representations
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problem, however, and the arguments below in favor of a lifetime view will generally
adopt the simplifying assumption that moral views correspond to a single utility function
and social welfare function.
For a welfarist moral view to provide useful guidance to decisionmakers, it must
do more than rank outcomes. It must also rank choices, in a given choice situation, as a
function of the possible outcomes of each choice. This is the problem of outfitting an
SWF for choice under uncertainty, which will be postponed until Part III.
What, exactly, are “outcomes”? In the case of unboundedly rational
decisionmakers – decisionmakers who may not be omniscient but have unbounded
reasoning abilities and mental storage capacities --- each outcome is what philosophers
call a “possible world”: a fully specified possible history of the universe. No humans are
unboundedly rational. SWFs with possible worlds as outcomes would be unusable by
humans. Rather, SWFs must operate on simplified possible worlds: simplified pictures of
possible realities. How to identify the appropriate simplification is a huge, unsolved
problem for welfarism, and consequentialism more generally, which I will not attempt to
address here. The problem is orthogonal to the time-slice problem and does not, I think,
affect my argument for the lifetime view or assessment of its legal implications.
So the SWF framework maps outcomes – simplified possible worlds – onto
vectors of utilities, and then uses an SWF to map these vectors onto numbers representing
the ranking of the outcomes. Economists virtually always make the further assumption
that SWFs satisfy the Pareto principle for outcomes, and most philosophers (even those
who care about equality) find that principle congenial. The Pareto principle for outcomes
says that, if at least one individual is better off in one outcome as compared to a second,
and no individual is worse off, the first outcome must be ranked higher. For the
remainder of the Article, the reader should understand (unless otherwise noted) that all
SWFs being discussed satisfy the Pareto principle for outcomes.10
What, then, is the distinction (within the family of SWFs satisfying the Pareto
principle for outcomes) between SWFs which are sensitive to distributional
considerations -- for short, “equity-regarding” SWFs – and SWFs which are not?
Economists have a simple answer. An SWF is equity-regarding if it satisfies the
so-called Pigou-Dalton axiom.11 The Pigou-Dalton axiom says that a transfer of a unit of
utility from a higher utility individual to a lower utility individual, holding constant total
utility, must increase social value. Note that the utilitarian SWF, which simply sums
may not be unique. Further, that extension may be helpful in allowing the SWF framework to cope with
incommensurability -- where a moral view provides a partial rather than complete ordering of outcomes.
The view corresponds to {(u1, w1), (u2, w2), … (uL, wL)}; each pair (ui,wi) provides a complete ordering of
outcomes; the partial ordering is the “intersection” of these complete orderings, i.e., one outcome is better
than another pursuant to the view iff it is better according to every (ui,wi) pair.
10
See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7, at 293-94. All SWFs also satisfy an anonymity constraint, id.,
which is even less controversial. Two vectors with the same utilities, but in a different order, must be
ranked the same.
11
See Adler & Sanchrico, supra note 7, at 298-300.
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utilities, and is the hallmark of an SWF that is not equity-regarding, does not satisfy the
Pigou-Dalton axiom.
THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE
(1, 5, 10, 15)=initial utility vector
Transfer units of utility (here,2) from a
higher utility level (10) to a lower utility
level (5), keeping total utility constant

(1, 7, 8, 15)=new utility vector

The Pigou-Dalton principle requires that
this change increase social welfare, i.e.,
w(1,7,8,15)>w(1,5,10,15).

How does this simple answer relate to the contemporary philosophical literature,
which has coalesced around three different conceptions of equality: a view commonly
known as “prioritarian,” a view which I shall term “comparativist,” and a view
commonly known as “sufficientist”?
“Prioritarians” do not essentially care about the pattern of well-being.12 Rather,
they give greater social value to increments to well-being that are realized by individuals
at lower levels of well-being. They believe that individuals who are worse off in
absolute terms have a stronger moral claim. There is a standard and intuitively
compelling way to represent “prioritarianism” in the SWF framework: namely, a
prioritarian SWF is one that sums an increasing, strictly concave function g of individual
utilities. Assume we have a vector u(O) with M entries (where M=N in the case of
lifetime welfarism, and M=N×K in the case of sublifetime welfarism). In other words,
u(O) = (u1, u2, …, uM), where u1 is the first utility number in the vector, u2 the second, up
M

to uM. Then a prioritarian SWF w has the following form: w(u (O)) = ∑ g (u j ) , where g is
j =1

an increasing, strictly concave function.
An increasing, strictly concave g-function, such as the square root or the
logarithm, has a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative.13 This means
12

See id. at 300-01.
This is imprecise, because strictly concave functions need not be fully differentiable. A precise
definition is that a strictly concave function g is such that the weighted average of the g-value of any two

13
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(1) that an increase in some individual’s utility, ceteris paribus, increases the value of the
SWF, that is,

M

∑ g (u
j =1

j

) , which is just what the Pareto principle for outcomes says; and (2)

that the increase in the value of the SWF produced by a small increase in an individual’s
utility (the first derivative of g) decreases as the level of that utility increases , which is
just a mathematical restatement of the prioritarian idea that changes in an individual’s
well-being have greater moral importance the lower the level of the individual’s wellbeing.
Any SWF which takes the form of summing an increasing, strictly concave
function of individual utilities will satisfy the Pigou-Dalton axiom. Note, further, that
any SWF which takes the form of summing an increasing, strictly concave function of
individual utilities will satisfy an “indifference” axiom. This says that the ranking of two
utility vectors should be unaffected by “indifferent” utilities: those that are the same in
the two vectors. “Indifference” is a precise and, once more, intuitively attractive way to
express the notion that prioritarians do not essentially care about the pattern of welfare
levels.

THE INDIFFERENCE AXIOM

Consider the initial pair of utility vectors
(a,b,x,y,c,d), (a*,b*,x,y,c*,d*), with the same
utilities in the 3rd and 4th positions. Change those
“indifferent” utilities to produce a new pair of
utility vectors (a,b,x+,y+,c,d), (a*,b*,x+,y+,
c*,d*). The “indifference” axiom says that
w(a,b,x,y,c,d)>w(a*,b*,x,y,c*,d*) if and only if
w(a,b,x+,y+,c,d)>w(a*,b*,x+,y+,c*,d*)

For example, if the social value of (2,10,100,100,3,5) is
greater than that of (4,4,100,100,4,4), then the social value
of (2,10,4,4,3,5) must be greater than that of (4,4,4,4,4,4).

In the case of prioritarianism, then, the translation into SWF language is pretty
straightforward. Things get a bit trickier when we turn to “comparativism.”
“Comparativists” do care essentially about patterns. To put this formally, a
“comparativist” SWF does not satisfy the indifference axiom. But we need to say more,
numbers is less than the g value of their weighted average, for all weights. See, e.g., RANGARAJAN K.
SUNDARAN, A FIRST COURSE IN OPTIMIZATION THEORY 173-85 (1996).
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because there are lots of SWFs which fail indifference but we would surely not want to
describe as equity-regarding. The simple answer is that a comparativist SWF is one that
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton axiom (and thus is equity-regarding), but fails indifference
(and in that sense essentially cares about patterns).14 This is rough, because there are
comparativists who think that the Pigou-Dalton axiom is too demanding.15 Once we
depart from prioritarianism and start to care about patterns, why insist that every PigouDalton transfer must be an improvement in the pattern? A somewhat better definition is
that a comparativist SWF fails indifference and counts a total-utility-preserving move to
perfect equality as an improvement. This may be too weak, but seems closer to the
truth,16 and shall be the definition I use here.17
COMPARATIVIST SWFs

An SWF that fails Indifference but satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle: the sum
of rank-weighted utilities. If (a,b,c,d) are utilities in ascending order, then
w=4a+3b+2c+d . The Pigou-Dalton principle is satisfied: w(1,3,7,12)=39, and if
we transfer 2 units from the fourth to the third entry, producing (1,3,9,10),
w(1,3,9,10)=41. However, the Indifference Axiom is not satisfied. While
w(5,10,12,16)<w(6,10,12,13), w(5,1,2,16)>w(6,1,2,13).

An SWF that fails Indifference and Pigou-Dalton but prefers perfect
equalization: An SWF that sums utilities, but adds some premium k to the
sum if the utilities are perfectly equal. Note how this fails Pigou-Dalton.
w(1,3,7,12)=23, and w(1,3,9,10)=23. Note also that it fails Indifference.
For example, if k is 6, then while
w(2,10,100,100)>w(4,4,100,100),w(2,10,4,4)<w(4,4,4,4).

“Sufficientists,” like prioritarians, deny that the pattern of well-being is itself of
moral significance.18 Rather, a concern for “equity” arises in virtue of the fact that
individuals who are worse off in absolute terms have a stronger moral claim. But, unlike
prioritarians, they believe that this claim evaporates once the individuals reach a level of
“sufficient” or “adequate” well-being. In other words, “sufficientists” incorporate a
14

See id. at 300-02.
See id. at 303; LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 83-84 (1993).
16
It is plausible that an SWF which generally ranks outcomes in light of total utility, but gives a bonus to
outcomes where all the utilities are exactly equal, should be counted as equity-regarding.
17
Note that, if an SWF counts every Pigou-Dalton transfer as an improvement (the stronger definition),
then it counts a move to total equality as an improvement (the weaker definition), because a move to
equality can be achieved by a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers. See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7, at 299
n.40.
18
See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745 (2003); Harry Frankfurt, Equality
as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21 (1987).
15
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morally critical threshold level of well-being into their theory. Those below the threshold
have stronger moral claims to welfare than those above. Those above the threshold do
not have stronger claims than those yet further above. To put this in SWF terms,
“sufficientists” (like prioritarians) accept the indifference axiom but accept the PigouDalton axiom only with respect to transfers across the threshold, and not with respect to
transfers between individuals above it. For example, imagine that the utility threshold is
20. Then a sufficientist SWF w will say that w(1,5,25,35)=w(1,5,27,33) -- despite the
transfer of 2 units from the fourth to the third entry -- but that w(1,5,25,35)<w(1,7,23,35).
The following table summarizes the features of the three families of equityregarding SWFs, as just explicated.

SWFs: A SUMMARY
-- The Utilitarian SWF (simple sum of utilities)
-- Equity Regarding SWFs
M

-- Prioritarian SWFs: w(u1,u2,…,uM)=

∑ g (u
j =1

j

) , where g is increasing and strictly concave

Prioritarian SWFs satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle and the Indifference axiom.
-- Comparativist SWFs: These do not satisfy the Indifference axiom. However, they do either (1)
satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle, or if not (2) at least count perfect equalization of utilities,
holding total utility constant, as an improvement.
-- Sufficientist SWFs: These incorporate a well-being threshold, and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton
principle with respect to transfers across the threshold, but not with respect to transfers above it.
They do satisfy the Indifference axiom.

A final point of clarification. Prioritarian, comparativist, and sufficientist SWFs
are equity-regarding, in the sense that they care about the distribution of well-being (more
precisely, in satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle, generally or across a threshold, or at
least preferring perfect equalization). But they are also sensitive to considerations other
then equity. If we add an increment to the largest utility in the vector, then that cannot be
an improvement with respect to equality, but still (given the Pareto principle for
outcomes) must be counted as a social improvement. To put the point another way,
prioritarian, comparativist, and sufficientist SWFs represent all-things-considered moral
judgments, integrating both considerations of distribution and considerations of Pareto
efficiency or overall well-being. No one who accepts the Pareto principle for outcomes
believes that our all-things-considered moral judgments are solely a matter of equity.
B.

Lifetime versus Sublifetime Views

The difference between lifetime and sublifetime equity-regarding views can now
be stated. I will assume that each outcome can be described as a series of temporally
locatable facts – facts that occur in arbitrarily small periods. (Because the facts of
relevance to welfare either consist of, or supervene upon, physical or mental facts
11

somewhere in the world, this assumption seems plausible.) There are N individuals in
the population. The lifetime equity-regarding view represents a given outcome as a
vector of N utilities, representing the lifetime well-being of each individual in that
outcome, where each utility is a function of all the facts about that outcome; and applies
some equity-regarding SWF (prioritarian, comparativist, or sufficientist) to that N-entry
vector. The sublifetime equity-regarding view cares about the distribution of individual
well-being during some temporal fraction of a lifetime. It divides the outcome into K
stages (these could be decades, years, months, or moments); represents the well-being of
each individual in a given stage with a stage utility number which is a function of all the
facts in that stage; and applies some equity-regarding SWF (prioritarian, comparativist,
sufficientist) to the N×K entry vector that results.
To put this a bit more formally, if F O are all the facts about outcome O, then
F O = ( F1O , F2O ,..., FKO ) , where F1O are all the facts about outcome O in period 1, F2O

are the facts about outcome O in period 2, up to FKO , the facts about outcome O in period
K. In the case of lifetime welfarism, u(O), the utility vector for outcome O, has N entries
(u1, u2, … ,uN), where ui is the lifetime utility of individual i. Each lifetime utility number
ui is a function of -- potentially influenced by -- the facts about the outcome in all
periods, that is by the whole array ( F1O , F2O ,..., FKO ) . In the case of sublifetime welfarism,
u(O), the utility vector for outcome O has N×K entries
(u1,1 , u2,1 ,..., u N ,1 ; u1,2 , u2,2 ,..., u N ,2 ;...; u1, K , u2, K ,..., u N , K ) , where u1,1 is the utility of individual
1 during period 1, u1,2 the utility of individual 1 during period 2, and so forth, up to u N , K ,
the utility of the last individual N during the last period K. Each ui ,k is a function of the
contemporaneous facts, the facts in period k, that is FkO . So sublifetime utilities u1,1, u2,1,
up to uN,1 are a function of F1O ; sublifetime utilities u1,2, u2,2, up to uN,2 are a function of

F2O ; and so forth.
Note some critical points about this conceptualization of the lifetime/sublifetime
distinction. First, I assume that a given individual’s sublifetime well-being during some
period is a function solely of the facts during that period. The proponents of sublifetime
accounts seem to adopt this premise implicitly,19 and it is intuitively plausible. How well
Sam’s life is going during a year depends on what happens during that year, and is not
dependent on what happens to him later on, or what happened to him earlier.
Second, I do not assume that a given individual’s lifetime or sublifetime wellbeing depends just on facts about his own mental states or physical body. As discussed in
a moment, the SWF framework is meant to mesh with a wide variety of conceptions of
19

As further discussed below, in Part II, McKerlie presents cases in which we (allegedly) prefer to equalize
sublifetime well-being, such as the noble-peasant case. These are cases in which the difference in
sublifetime well-being during some period supervenes on facts in that period -- for example, facts about
who is a noble and who a peasant at a particular point in time. He and Parfit also discuss our preference to
relieve temporary suffering -- the idea, here, is that a person is particularly badly off at a given time
because she is suffering at that time.
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well-being. An individual’s well-being during a period, or over his lifetime, may depend
on what other individuals are doing or thinking (for example, on how well his children
are doing, or what his social status is), or other facts about the world outside his mind and
body.
Finally, I do not assume that an individual’s lifetime utility is additively separable
into the sum of some function of sublifetime utilities (either the straight sum of
sublifetime utilities, or the sum of some transformation thereof).20 Although economists
sometimes assume additive separability, it is an oversimplification – and, for our
purposes, a problematic one. Additive separability rules out the possibility of crosstemporal interaction effects, between welfare-relevant facts in different periods, in
producing lifetime well-being. For example, it rules out the possibility of an improvement
effect -- namely that a life where facts with respect to some aspect of well-being get
better over time is better just by virtue of this improvement. There is strong experimental
support for an improvement effect, and for other failures of additive separability, and
there is no reason to think that the best theory of lifetime well-being satisfies additive
separability.21
20

Formally, additive separability says that ui, the lifetime utility of individual i, can be decomposed as

follows: ui = v (ui ,1 ) + v (ui ,2 ) + ... + v (ui , K ) , where v is some function and ui,k is the sublifetime utility
of individual i during period k.
21

The issues, here, involve what might be called an “independence” condition with respect to the
relationship between temporal facts and lifetime well-being. (This is structurally very similar to the
“indifference” principle discussed earlier, although that principle involved the connection between utilities
and social welfare, while this one involves the connection between sublifetime facts in one individual’s life
and his lifetime well-being.) The independence condition says the following. Consider two arrays of facts
in periods 1 through K, with identical facts in one or more periods. Produce two new arrays of facts, by
taking the periodic facts that are the same in both arrays and substituting any other pair of identical periodic
facts. Then the ordering of the arrays must be preserved. If the original two arrays produced equal lifetime
utility for individual i, then the two new arrays must do so. Similarly, if one of the two arrays produced
greater lifetime utility for individual i, then the new array created from this one must produce greater
lifetime utility than the new array created from the other array. To illustrate, if (A,B,W,X,C) and
(A*,B*,W,X,C*) are two arrays of facts (in a 5-period case), then the temporal facts are identical in periods
3 and 4 across the arrays. We produce two new arrays by substituting new facts: Y for W and Z for X. So
we now have two new arrays (A,B,Y,Z,C) and (A*,B*,Y,Z,C*). If (A,B,W,X,C) produces a higher
lifetime utility for i than (A*,B*,W,X,C*), then (A,B,Y,Z,C) must produce a higher lifetime utility than
(A*,B*,Y,Z,C*). And if (A,B,W,X,C) produces the same lifetime utility as (A*,B*,W,X,C*), then
(A,B,Y,Z,C) must produce the same lifetime utility as (A*,B*,Y,Z,C*).
It is easy to see that additive separability implies that the “independence” condition is satisfied.
Remember that each sublifetime utility for individual i (that is, each ui,k,, where k ranges from 1 to K) is just
a function of the facts in period k. On the independence condition and additive separability, see, e.g., Han
Bleichrodt & Amiram Gafni, Time Preference, The Discounted Utility Model, and Health, 15 J. HEALTH
ECON. 51-53, 55; Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in
TIME AND DECISION 13, 21 (George Loewenstein et al., 2003)
The “independence” condition, in turn, precludes an improvement effect. For example, if we are
inclined to say that steadily improving sequences of mental states such as (unhappy, neutral, happy) are
better for well-being as such, we will violate the “independence” condition. We will say that (unhappy,
neutral, happy) is better than (unhappy, happy, neutral), but that (happy, neutral, happy) and (happy, happy,
neutral) are equally good, which violates “independence.” For philosophical argument in favor of an
improvement effect, see J. David Velleman, Well-Being and Time, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 329,
331 (John Martin Fischer ed., 1993). This argument is buttressed by empirical work. “One of the most
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Indeed, I do not assume that lifetime utility is a function of sublifetime utility at
all. Someone’s lifetime well-being in an outcome depends on everything that happens in
that outcome, in turn parsable into everything that happens during each period; but it is a
further, and contestable, assumption that the rich information about temporal facts in each
period can be compressed into a single utility number, with lifetime well-being in turn a
function of the utility number in each period. There is no reason to saddle the lifetime
view with that assumption either.
C.

Why Welfarism?

The SWF framework is, I believe, an attractive framework for thinking about
policy problems. As already mentioned, the framework is agnostic about the nature of
well-being. It can be meshed with objectivist accounts, preferentialist accounts, or
mental state accounts (the three leading families of views about well-being), or indeed
with any other account.22 For any moral view, whatever its account of well-being, an
individual’s lifetime or sublifetime utility represents her lifetime or sublifetime
attainment with respect to that.
Further, as should now be abundantly clear, SWFs are potentially sensitive to
equity considerations. Utilitarianism is simply one variant of welfarism. Finally, the use
of a formal, mathematical vocabulary helps sharpen important distinctions relevant to
discussions of equality – for example, what prioritarianism means, what cross-temporal
interaction effects are, or (as we shall see in Part III) what the different conceptions of
choice under uncertainty involve.
Still, the reader might object to the framework. She might object, first, that the
precision mathematical representation imports is purchased at a cost – the cost of
ignoring incommensurability. The framework tries to represent a moral view’s verdict
robust findings in research about assessment of experiences is the clear preference for improvement over
time. … Preference for improvement has been demonstrated in many domains, including monetary
payments, experiences such as vacations, queuing events, pain, discomfort, medical outcomes and
treatments, gambling, and academic performance.” Dan Ariely & Ziv Carmon, Summary Assessments of
Experiences: The Whole is Different from the Sum of its Parts, in TIME AND DECISION, supra, at 323, 327
(citations omitted). See also Frederick, supra, at 28-29; George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Preferences
for Sequences of Outcomes, 100 PSYCH. REV. 91 92-93 (1993). Other empirical findings inconsistent with
the “independence” condition include a preference to spread rather than cluster enjoyable preferences:
“maximal endurable time” preferences with respect to health states; and the “peak-end” rule for
retrospective evaluations of experiential sequences. See Frederick, supra, at 29-30; Aki Tsuchiya & Paul
Dolan, The QALY Model and Individual Preferences for Health States and Health Profiles over Time: A
Systematic Review of the Literature, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 460, 461 (2005); Ariely & Carmon, supra,
at 326-27
To be sure, the question how the temporal components of well-being produce lifetime well-being
is normative, not empirical. The welfarist is not obliged to incorporate all of the observed violations of the
“independence” condition into her account of lifetime well-being. (For example, she might see “peak-end”
evaluations as a kind of irrationality.) But I suggest that many plausible accounts of lifetime well-being
will violate the “independence” condition in some way.
22
For a discussion of these various accounts, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 28-35 (2006).

14

with respect to the ordering of outcomes by an SWF. But, in fact, there are plausible
moral views which incompletely order outcomes – which include pairs of outcomes such
that neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good – and no such ordering can
be represented by a single SWF operating on a single utility vector for each outcome.23 I
have already suggested, however, that the problem of incommensurability can be handled
by conceptualizing a given welfarist moral view as corresponding to a set of pairs of
utility functions and SWFs, rather than a single pair.24
A second and quite different objection is that the SWF framework ignores
considerations of choice and responsibility. In ranking outcomes, we should be sensitive
to information about the causal origins of individuals’ well-being attainments, and not
simply to those attainments. Did individuals end up where they did because of “brute
luck,” or because of the foreseeable result of their own choices? Dworkin, Sen, and other
prominent philosophers have challenged welfarist accounts of equality on these
grounds.25 The difficulty is that no one has yet provided a general framework for
integrating considerations of overall well-being and the distribution of well-being (which
the SWF framework accomplishes) with information about individual choice and
responsibility. This is an active area of research, where attractive solutions may well
emerge, but for now the question of how a responsibility-sensitive welfarist would
analyze the time-slice problem is not one I can address.
II.

LIFETIME VERSUS SUBLIFETIME VIEWS: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS

Having explicated the SWF framework and the conceptual difference between
lifetime and sublifetime views, I now turn to substantive philosophical analysis. Section
A presents the basic case for lifetime welfarism. Sections B and C address two important
responses to that case: one, by Dennis McKerlie, which adopts a standard picture of
personal identity over time; and a second, by Derek Parfit, which trades on a deflationary
view of personal identity.

A.

The Basic Case for the Lifetime View

A number of prominent philosophers of equality have adopted a lifetime view.
This includes Thomas Nagel, who writes: “the subject of an egalitarian principle is not
the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospective
quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death ….”26 It also includes John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin, who believe that distributive justice requires a fair allocation of
lifetime shares of “primary goods” or “resources.”27 The philosophers Norman Daniels
and Dan Brock, who have theorized about the distribution of health care, have also
23

An SWF assigns a single real number to each utility vector. Every real number is greater than, less than,
or precisely equal to every other real number.
24
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25
See Arneson, supra note 2.
26
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 69 (1991). See also THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS
120, 124 n.16 (1979).
27
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78,178 (1971); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2:
Equality of Resources, 10 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 283, 304-05 (1981).
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argued for the lifetime perspective, as has Alan Williams, a leading health economist.28
To quote Brock:
People’s lives extend continuously over time, and our moral concern should be for the lives they
lead, not simply for how good their lives are at a particular point in time, whether now or
sometime in the past or the future. A concern for the worse off should reflect this concern for
people’s lives as a whole and so not ignore the duration of people’s poor health. Moreover, in
other areas besides health we often take what a person has had or suffered in the past to be
relevant in distributing scarce benefits now; if one child has had little opportunity for travel in the
past in comparison with her well-traveled sibling, fairness supports giving a travel opportunity to
29
her now that can only go to one of them ….

The basic argument in favor of a lifetime view is straightforward. I will articulate
this argument in terms of well-being, because (again) the framework for this Article is
welfarist. Egalitarian considerations enter morality because it is important to treat
separate persons fairly.30 It is unfair that some individuals end up with more well-being
than others, at least where the worse-off individuals are not responsible for their plight.
Another way to put the same idea is this: individuals are moral equals; as equals,
individuals have equal claims to flourish, to have good lives; and therefore a distribution
of well-being that departs from equality is prima facie problematic. Such a distribution
may be justified, all-things-considered – for example, a Pareto-superior move away from
perfect equality will be justified, all-things-considered – but it has the troubling feature
that some individuals’ claims to well-being are more fully satisfied than others’.
On this picture of the moral force of equality, well-being is a quantifiable
characteristic of each person in each outcome. Call it “property W”. Individuals have
equal claims to property W; and the unequal distribution of property W is, prima facie,
morally problematic.
Let us adopt, now, a traditional premise about personal identity: namely, that
each human is a single person, from birth to death. The upshot is that individuals or
persons endure over time. A single person has multiple temporal stages. What, then, is
property W? We cannot say that property W is the individual’s sublifetime well-being,
full stop – because (on the assumption of multiple temporal stages) there are multiple
sublifetime well-being properties associated with each person. We might adopt the view
28

See Dan W. Brock, Priority to the Worst Off in Health-Care Resource Prioritization, in MEDICINE AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 362, 370 (Rosamond Rhodes et al. eds., 2002); NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND
JUSTIFICATION 257-83 (1996); NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS’ KEEPER (1988); NORMAN DANIELS,
JUST HEALTH CARE 86-113 (1985); Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the “Fair
Innings” Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117 (1997).
29
Brock, supra note 28, at 370.
30
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have emphasized the distinction between “fairness” and “welfarism,”
so it may seem oxymoronic for the equity-regarding welfarist to appeal to fairness considerations. See
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). But a view which understands
well-being itself as the “currency” of distributive justice, and explains the weight of distributional
considerations by pointing out the unfairness of giving some individuals more than others, is fully welfarist
in the standard sense and indeed in Kaplow and Shavell’s. Such a view satisfies the supervenience
requirement definitional of welfarism: no outcome is ranked better than another unless there is some wellbeing difference between the outcomes.
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that property W is each individual’s sublifetime well-being during some stipulated stage
(say, the last year of her life, or the first year, or the middle year). But picking one stage
over another as the stipulated stage seems arbitrary. How the individual does during the
stipulated stage is no more a property of that individual, and no more a well-being
property, than how she does during any other stage.
Further, for any stipulated stage, we can imagine lowering some person P’s wellbeing during that stage, with a compensating increase in a different stage, so that her
lifetime well-being remains the same. It would be odd to think that this shift, without
more, could change our assessment of the fairness of the distribution of well-being as
between P and other individuals. The extent to which P’s claim to well-being is satisfied,
and to which other individuals’ claims to well-being are satisfied, seem to be unchanged
by the shift. P has been (seemingly) compensated for the loss in well-being during the
stipulated stage by an increase in well-being at another time. But, if property W is wellbeing during the stipulated stage, this temporal shift in P’s well-being – without more –
could affect our assessment of the fairness of distribution of well-being as between P and
other individuals.
Here’s another way to make this last point. If individuals endure over time, then
– as a matter of honoring individuals’ claims to well-being – it should always or at least
often be possible to compensate an individual for a loss of well-being during one period
with a gain during another. Call this “the possibility of intrapersonal, intertemporal
compensation.” (PIIC). But, in turn, PIIC will undercut the identification of property W
with an individual’s sublifetime well-being during any stipulated stage. With PIIC in
hand, we can always construct cases in which a change in individuals’ well-being during
the stipulated stage, with compensating changes later or earlier in their lives, produces no
true change in how equally well-being is distributed across persons , but would be
recorded as changing that distribution by a sublifetime view focused on the stipulated
stage. As Nagel explains:
[The possibility of intrapersonal compensation] implies … that if an egalitarian theory is accepted,
it should apply only across lives rather than within them. It is a reason for taking individual
human lives, rather than individual experiences, as the units over which any distributive principle
31
should operate.

The upshot is that property W is lifetime well-being. Given the persistence of individual
identity over time, it seems hard to reject PIIC; and PIIC, in turn, means that the wellbeing characteristic whose fair distribution equality requires cannot be well-being during
any stipulated sublifetime stage.
Thus the basic case for a lifetime account. We shall now consider two arguments
for a sublifetime view: one, principally advanced by Dennis McKerlie, which does not
make revisionary claims about personal identity over time; and another, advanced by
Derek Parfit, which does.

31

NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 26, at 120.
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B. McKerlie’s Response
In a series of articles, Dennis McKerlie has argued for the moral relevance of
sublifetime well-being without challenging the standard view that each human is one and
the same person from birth until death.32 In the early articles, McKerlie adopts what
might be seen as a kind of sublifetime comparativism. In the more recent work,
McKerlie has shifted to a sublifetime prioritarianism. I shall consider both of these
arguments, as well as a third issue – which McKerlie doesn’t raise – concerning the
consistency of the lifetime view and sufficientism.
1.
Intuitions about Simultaneous Sublifetime Inequalities: A Sublifetime
Comparativism?
In the early work, McKerlie appeals to our intuitions about synchronizing certain
sublifetime sources of well-being across persons which, allegedly, show that we prefer to
equalize sublifetime well-being even when lifetime well-being is held constant.33 He
provides the following sort of example.
[Imagine a society] that contains great inequality, with happier lives attached to certain
social positions. But at a fixed time people change places and switch from a superior position to
an inferior one or vice versa. One example would be a feudal society in which peasants or nobles
exchange roles every ten years. The result is that people’s lives as wholes are equally happy.
Nevertheless during a given time period the society contains great inequality …. If equality
between complete lives were all that mattered, an egalitarian could not object to it. But I think that
34
many egalitarians would find it objectionable.

To give a modern example, as between two societies in which individuals sometimes
have periodic incomes of $20,000, sometimes periodic incomes of $100,000, we prefer
(ceteris paribus) the society in which everyone has the lower income at the same time.
In other words, McKerlie suggests that we intuitively prefer outcome II to
outcome I in the following sort of case.

32

See Dennis McKerlie, Egalitarianism and the Difference Between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal
Judgments, in EGALITARIANISM (Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2007);Dennis McKerlie,
Justice Between the Young and the Old, 30 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 152 (2002); Dennis McKerlie,
Dimensions of Equality, 13 UTILITAS 263 (2001);Dennis McKerlie, Equality Between Age-Groups, 21
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 275 (1992); Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Time, 99 ETHICS 475 (1989)..
33
My analysis in this subsection is indebted to work by Klemens Kappel and R.I. Sikora, who provide a
variety of criticisms of McKerlie’s sublifetime comparativism. See Klemens Kappel, Equality, Priority,
and Time, 9 UTILITAS 203 (1997); R.I. Sikora, Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distributions
Schemes, 99 ETHICS 492 (1989).
34
McKerlie, Equality and Time, supra note 32, at 479. Larry Temkin offers a similar example. See
TEMKIN, supra note 15, at 235-38.
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Person A
Person B

Outcome I
Time Period
1
2
Peasant
Noble
Noble
Peasant

3
Peasant
Noble

4
Noble
Peasant

Person A
Person B

Outcome II
Time Period
1
2
Peasant
Noble
Peasant
Noble

3
Peasant
Peasant

4
Noble
Noble

Person A
Person B

Outcome I
Time Period
1
2
$20,000
$100,000
$100,000
$20,000

3
$20,000
$100,000

4
$100,000
$20,000

Person A
Person B

Outcome II
Time Period
1
2
$20,000
$100,000
$20,000
$100,000

3
$20,000
$20,000

4
$100,000
$100,000

OR

Let us grant McKerlie the intuition. The question is how one explains it. One
could explain the intuition by assuming that being a peasant or having an income of
$20,000 has a low context-invariant sublifetime utility (say, 2) and that being a noble or
having an income of $100,000 has a high context-invariant sublifetime utility (say, 10).
This is the picture McKerlie seems to be tendering. In other words, McKerlie seems to
be suggesting that the sublifetime and lifetime well-being attainments of the individuals
in outcome I are accurately represented by the utility numbers in I*, and that the
sublifetime and lifetime well-being attainments of the individuals in outcome II are
accurately represented by the utility numbers in II*.

19

I* (Possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities
corresponding to Outcome I)

Person A
Person B

1
2
10

Lifetime
Utility

Time Period
2
10
2

3
2
10

4
10
2

X
X

II* (Possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities
Corresponding to Outcome II)

Person A
Person B

1
2
2

Lifetime
Utility

Time Period
2
10
10

3
2
2

4
10
10

X
X

Clearly, the lifetime view cannot explain a preference for II* over I*. Any SWF,
applied to lifetime utilities, will rank the outcomes the same, because the vectors of
lifetime utilities are identical. Note also that a sublifetime prioritarian view – a sum of an
increasing, strictly concave function g of sublifetime utilities – cannot explain a
preference for II* over I*. Whatever the g-function, the sum of that function applied to
the sublifetime utilities is the same in I* and II*. However, there are equity-regarding
SWFs, applied to sublifetime utilities, which would favor II* over I*. In particular, a
comparativist view that focused on the pattern of sublifetime utility within each time
period could explain a preference for II* over I*. Here’s a simple example: an SWF
which aggregates sublifetime utilities, but gives an outcome a premium for every time
period in which everyone’s sublifetime utility is exactly equal.
But why assume that outcomes I and II are accurately represented by I* and II*?
The lifetime welfarist will see outcome I as an instance in which individual inequality in
some time period with respect to some source of well-being – social status in the
noble/peasant case, income in the $100,000/$20,000 case--– itself lowers lifetime wellbeing. In other words, it is worse for individual P to be a peasant during some portion of
his life if other members of the society are nobles at the same time than to be a peasant
during some portion of his life when everyone else in the society is also a peasant. Being
a peasant with nobles in the vicinity reduces P’s lifetime well-being because it is
demoralizing, or frustrating, or lowers self-respect. The impact on lifetime well-being of
the status of peasant during some portion of a life is not context invariant. Similarly, it is
worse for P to have a life in which he has an income of $20,000 during some period when
some members of the society have higher incomes during that period than to have that
very same income during a period when everyone else has the same income.
In short, the lifetime welfarist can see outcomes I and II as accurately represented
by I+ and II+.
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I+ (Possible lifetime utilities
corresponding to Outcome I -- noble/peasant version)

Person A
Person B

Time Period
1
2
Peasant
Noble
Noble
Peasant

Lifetime
Utility
3
Peasant
Noble

4
Noble
Peasant

X
X

II+ (Possible lifetime utilities
corresponding to Outcome II -- noble/peasant version)

Person A
Person B

Lifetime
Utility

Time Period
1
2
Peasant
Noble
Peasant
Noble

3
Peasant
Peasant

4
Noble
Noble

Y>X
Y>X

OR
I+ (Possible lifetime utilities
corresponding to Outcome I -- $100,000/$20,000 version)

Person A
Person B

Time Period
1
2
$20,000
$100,000
$100,000
$20,000

Lifetime
Utility
3
$20,000
$100,000

4
$100,000
$20,000

X
X

II+ (Possible lifetime utilities
corresponding to Outcome II -- $100,000/$20,000 version)

Person A
Person B

Time Period
1
2
$20,000
$100,000
$20,000
$100,000

Lifetime
Utility
3
$20,000
$20,000

4
$100,000
$100,000

Y>X
Y>X

Any SWF that respects the Pareto principle for outcomes and is applied to lifetime
utilities, including any equity-regarding SWF, will prefer II+ to I+.35
McKerlie has given us a hypothetical case – a case in which we improve an
outcome by synchronizing individuals’ attainments with respect to some source of wellbeing (here, being a peasant versus being a noble, or having $20.000 versus having
$100,000) – and argues that the social improvement occurs by equalizing sublifetime
well-being, without changing the individuals’ lifetime well-being. I suggest, instead, that

35

For a simple way to generate a lifetime utility number Y in II+ that is greater than X in I+, assign a
sublifetime utility of 2 to being a peasant with other peasants around (or having $20,000 where everyone
else has $20,000 at the same time), 10 to being a noble with other nobles around, 1 to being a peasant with
nobles around, and 10.5 to being a noble with peasants around; and then make lifetime utility the sum of
these context-variant sublifetime utilities.
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improvement occurs because the synchronization itself changes the individuals’ lifetime
well-being.
What favors my interpretation? To begin, we have the basic case for lifetime
welfarism, presented earlier. In addition, and crucially, in cases where the
synchronization clearly does not affect lifetime well-being, our intuition in favor of
synchronization is much weaker. Imagine a society in which everyone works 5 days a
week, spends one weekend day doing chores, and one weekend day having fun. In the
first outcome, half the population does chores on Saturdays and has fun on Sundays; the
other half has the fun on Saturdays. In a second outcome, weekend activities are
synchronized so that everyone does chores on Saturdays. Or (to use a longer time slice),
in some society everyone has a minor depressive episode, lasting several years, at one
point during his or her life. In one outcome, these episodes occur at different times; in a
second outcome, they are synchronized. The sublifetime comparativist who sees the
noble-peasant case or the $100,000/$20,000 income case as characterized by I* and II*
will also presumably prefer to synchronize weekend chores and fun, or to synchronize
depressive episodes, in the cases just described. But the intuition in favor of doing so (I
suggest) is much weaker in these cases.
Indeed, as McKerlie has come to acknowledge in more recent work, the problem
with a sublifetime comparativism that prefers to reduce simultaneous sublifetime
inequality is that the moral role of simultaneity is suspect.36 Why should we be bothered
by the fact that person A has a lower sublifetime well-being during some period as
compared to person B’s sublifetime well-being during the same period, but not that
person A has a lower sublifetime well-being during some period as compared to person
B’s sublifetime well-being during some other period? Consider, again, outcomes I* and
II*. In each outcome, there are 16 pairings of the form (u1,k ; u2,l ) with u1,k the sublifetime
utility of the first person, person A, during period k, and u2,l the sublifetime utility of
person B during period l, k and l each ranging from one to four. Note further that, in each
outcome, there are four such pairings with the numbers (2,2); eight pairings (10,2) or
(2,10); and 4 pairings (10,10). And, of course, in each outcome the two individuals’
lifetime utilities are the same. So why should we morally prefer II* to I*? Such a
preference has no theoretical warrant, given a standard picture of personal identity; it is
not needed to explain our intuitions in cases such as the noble-peasant or
$100,000/$20,000 cases, as I have argued; and it is inconsistent with intuitions in other
cases (such as weekend chores or depressive episode).
2.

Sublifetime Prioritarianism

McKerlie now advocates a sublifetime prioritarianism. He suggest, to begin, that
sublifetime prioritarianism actually provides the best account of individual “prudence” or
36

For recent work in which McKerlie has moved away from sublifetime comparativism and towards
sublifetime prioritarianism, see Egalitarianism and the Difference between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal
Judgments, supra note 32; Dimensions of Equality, supra note 32, at 273-88; Justice Between the Young
and the Old, supra note 32, at 163-74.
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self-interest.37 On this account, a prudent individual -- one who maximizes her lifetime
well-being -- will give greater weight to changes in her sublifetime well-being that occur
when she is at a low level of sublifetime well-being, as compared to changes in her
sublifetime well-being that occur when she is at a higher level of sublifetime well-being.
In short, an individual’s lifetime well-being in an outcome is the sum of an increasing,
strictly concave function of her sublifetime well-being, not a simple sum of her
sublifetime well-being.
McKerlie’s Account of Prudence
Lifetime
Utility (g increasing and strictly concave)

1

Time Period
2
3

4

Person A

u1,1

u1,2

u1,3

u1,4

g (u1,1 ) + g (u1,2 ) + g (u1,3 ) + g (u1,4 )

Person B

u2,1

u2,2

u2,3

u2,4

g (u2,1 ) + g (u2,2 ) + g (u2,3 ) + g (u2,4 )

Why does this matter? Note that, even if McKerlie’s account of prudence is
correct, there is still a difference between an equity-regarding view that evaluates
outcomes by applying a given prioritarian SWF to lifetime utilities, and an equityregarding view that applies that same SWF to sublifetime utilities. The account of
prudence does not show that the two approaches converge.38
37

See Dimensions of Equality, supra note 32, at 281-88; Justice Between the Young and the Old, supra note
32, at 168-74.
38
The sublifetime prioritarian would evaluate outcomes by applying the increasing and strictly concave gfunction to sublifetime utilities, and summing. The lifetime prioritarian would evaluate outcomes by using
the g-function once to determine each individual’s lifetime utility as a function of her sublifetime utilities,
and then by calculating the sum of the g-function applied to these lifetime utilities. For example, imagine
that the lifetime and sublifetime prioritarian both use the square root as the g-function, and that each
individual’s lifetime utility is the sum of the square root of sublifetime utility. Then the lifetime
prioritarian will say that outcome II below is worse than outcome I, while the sublifetime prioritarian will
say that they are equally good.

Person A
Person B

1
4
9

Outcome I (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)
Time Period
Lifetime Utility
2
3
4
9
4
9
10
4
9
4
10

Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20
Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.32

Person A
Person B

1
4
9

Outcome II (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)
Time Period
Lifetime Utility
2
3
4
25
4
9
12
4
9
0
8
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What it would mean, more narrowly, is that sublifetime prioritarianism would be
the correct approach to choosing between outcomes if individuals were identical.39 In
that sense (perhaps?!) McKerlie’s account of prudence might be seen as offering a kind
of analogical support for sublifetime prioritarianism in the more general and realistic case
where individuals are not identical. Further, on McKerlie’s account of prudence,
sublifetime prioritarianism would never conflict with the Pareto principle applied to
lifetime utilities (even where individuals are heterogeneous). 40 The divergence between
Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20
Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.29 (which is less than 6.32)
39

In other words, in comparing outcomes like I and II below, a lifetime prioritarian view that determines
each individual’s lifetime utility as the sum of a g-function of sublifetime utilities (g increasing and strictly
concave), and then calculates social value as the sum of that g-function of lifetime utilities, will reach the
same result as a sublifetime prioritarianism that simply applies the g-function to all the sublifetime utilities
and sums. This is illustrated by using the square root as the g-function, but is true for any increasing,
strictly concave g-function.
Outcome I (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)
Time Period
Lifetime Utility
1
2
3
4
Person A
4
9
4
9
10
Person B
4
9
4
9
10
Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20
Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.32
Outcome II (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)
Time Period
Lifetime Utility
1
2
3
4
Person A
25
36
0
0
11
Person B
25
36
0
0
11
Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 22
Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.63

In such cases of identical individuals, if in one outcome the sum of the g-function of sublifetime utilities is
greater, than each individual’s lifetime utility must be greater as well, and (because the g function is
increasing, i.e., the lifetime prioritarian satisfies the Pareto principle for outcomes) the lifetime prioritarian
must see that outcome as better.
40
Imagine that one outcome is a Pareto-improvement in lifetime utilities over a second. In other words,
either every individual is better off in the first outcome, or some individuals are better off and the others are
equally well-off. In either event, it would follow -- since each individual’s lifetime utility is the sum of the
g-function of her sublifetime utilities -- that the sum of the g-function of sublifetime utilities is greater in
the first outcome. But then the sublifetime prioritarian must say that the first outcome is better. For
example, consider the following case, more once using the square root as the g-function for the sake of
illustration.
Outcome I (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)
Time Period
Lifetime Utility
1
2
3
4
Person A
4
9
4
9
10
Person B
9
4
9
4
10
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sublifetime and lifetime approaches would be limited to pairs of outcomes I and II where
some individuals have greater lifetime well-being in one outcome and others have greater
lifetime well-being in the other. Thus, McKerlie’s account of prudence – if true – would
soften the conflict between sublifetime and lifetime approaches in the case of
heterogeneous individuals, and thus might be seen as bolstering any preexisting argument
for the sublifetime approach.
But McKerlie’s is almost surely not the correct account of prudence. If there are
interactions between an individual’s sublifetime well-being in different stages in
producing her lifetime well-being, such as improvement effects, additive separability fails
and lifetime well-being cannot be represented as a function of sublifetime well-being –
whether a simple sum of sublifetime utility, or the sum of an increasing, strictly concave
function of sublifetime utility.41
A second and stronger argument for sublifetime prioritarianism, advanced by
McKerlie as well as some other philosophers, appeals to our intuitions about pain and
other forms of suffering. The claim is that, intuitively, someone who is currently in great
pain has a stronger claim on our assistance, as opposed to someone who is currently in a
less painful state, even if the first person’s lifetime well-being is greater. To simply the
analysis, here, I will ignore non-hedonic sources of well-being and assume that lifetime
and sublifetime well-being is just a function of negative affects (pains) and positive
affects (pleasures).
Consider first a preference for outcome X over outcome Y in the case below.
Affects can be strongly, moderately, or mildly negative; neutral; or mildly, moderately, or
strongly positive. (In the table, “mod.” is short for “moderately”.)

Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20
Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.32
Outcome II (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)
Time Period
Lifetime Utility
1
2
3
4
Person A
4
25
4
9
12
Person B
9
4
9
4
10
Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 22
Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.63
41

On additive separability, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Person A
Person B

Person A
Person B

Person A
Person B

1
mod. positive
mild negative

Status quo
Time Period
2
mod. positive
mild negative

1
mod. positive
mild negative

Outcome X (relieving A’s pain in period 3)
Time Period
2
3
4
mod. positive
mod. negative
mod. positive
mild negative
mild negative
mild negative

1
mod. positive
mild negative

Outcome Y (relieving B’s pain in period 3)
Time Period
2
3
4
mod. positive
strong negative mod. positive
mild negative
neutral
mild negative

3
strong negative
mild negative

4
mod. positive
mild negative

In the status quo, person A’s affects are moderately positive in all periods except period
3, where he suffers great pain, while person B’s affects are mildly negative in all the
periods. In outcome X, we give A the pain relief in period 3, thereby moving him from a
strongly negative state in that period to a moderately negative state. In outcome Y, we
give B the pain relief in period 3, thereby moving him from a mildly negative state to a
neutral state.
Grant the intuition that we prefer outcome X to outcome Y in this case. This sort
of intuition about pain relief is one that the lifetime welfarist can accommodate. It is
possible that the lifetime well-being A would experience, as a result of a strongly
negative affect in one period, is worse than the lifetime well-being of all the other lives in
the example. The strongly negative affect in that period may “ruin” that whole life, either
because of non-additivities, or even within the context of an additively separable model
of lifetime well-being, so that the choice between X and Y is as follows.

Person A
Person B

Outcome X (relieving A’s pain in period 3)
Time period
1
2
3
4
mod. positive
mod. positive
mod. negative
mod. positive
mild negative
mild negative
mild negative
mild negative

Lifetime
utility
56
48

Person A
Person B

Outcome Y (relieving B’s pain in period 3)
Time period
1
2
3
4
mod. positive
mod. positive
strong negative mod. positive
mild negative
mild negative
neutral
mild negative

Lifetime
utility
45
49
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Any prioritarian SWF, applied to lifetime utilities, will pick outcome X over outcome
Y.42
But there are other examples involving pain relief that a lifetime view has more
difficulty handling. Klemens Kappel provides the following example:
In a casualty department in a hospital two persons, A and B, are in pain. Unfortunately,
only one of them can be given pain relieving treatment since there is a shortage of the particular
painkiller needed. A’s pain is much stronger than B’s pain. However, B did in the past suffer
from pains similar to those he has now, and these pains went on for a considerably longer time and
were not treated. … Suppose, finally, that whoever we treat, the benefit will be the same because
A’s stronger pain will be only partly relieved, while B’s pain will be fully relieved.43

Now, the outcomes are X* and Y*. B is in strongly negative affects in all periods except
period 3; A is in a strongly negative affect in period 3, otherwise in a moderate positive
state; and we have to choose between giving the pain relief to A in period 3 (outcome
X*) or to B in period 3 (outcome Y*).

Person A
Person B

Person A
Person B

Person A
Person B

1
mod. positive
strong negative

Status quo*
Time Period
2
mod. positive
strong negative

1
mod. positive
strong negative

Outcome X* (relieving A’s pain in period 3)
Time Period
2
3
4
mod. positive
mod. negative
mod. positive
strong negative mild negative
strong negative

1
mod. positive
strong negative

Outcome Y* (relieving B’s pain in period 3)
Time Period
2
3
4
mod. positive
strong negative mod. positive
strong negative neutral
strong negative

3
strong negative
mild negative

4
mod. positive
strong negative

In this kind of case, by contrast with the first pain case, it seems very clear that
A’s lifetime well-being will be higher than B’s even if we give B the pain relief and not

42

To get these lifetime utilities within the context of an additively separable model, assume that lifetime
utility is the simple sum of sublifetime utility; that the sublifetime utility of a strongly negative state is 0;
and that the sublifetime utilities of moderately negative, mildly negative, neutral, mildly positive,
moderately positive, and strongly positive states are, respectively, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. Given
anonymity, the lifetime prioritarian must count the second outcome as equal to one in which person A gets
49 and person B gets 45, which in turn is Pareto inferior in lifetime utilities to the first outcome.
43
Kappel, supra note 33, at 211. See also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 341, 344 (1984).
Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832, 869-70 (1986).
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A. Therefore, an intuition that we should choose outcome X *(relieving A’s sublifetime
pain) is tougher for the lifetime welfarist to handle.
But maybe not impossible. If giving A the pain relief produces a greater change in
lifetime well-being than giving B the pain relief, a lifetime prioritarian could justify the
choice of X* over Y*. In other words, the facts in X* and Y* might correspond to the
utilities in X+ and Y+. Assume that strongly, moderately, and mildly negative affects
have a sublifetime utility of 0, 3, 5 respectively; a neutral affect has a sublifetime utility
of 7; mildly, moderately, and strongly positive affects have a sublifetime utility of 9, 11,
and 13 respectively and that (absent an improvement affect) lifetime utility is the simple
sum of sublifetime utility.
X+ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities
corresponding to outcome X*)

Person A
Person B

Person A
Person B

1
11
0

1
11
0

4
11
0

Lifetime
utility
36
5

Y+ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities
corresponding to outcome Y*)
Time period
2
3
4
11
0
11
0
7
0

Lifetime
utility
33
7

2
11
0

Time period
3
3
5

Observe that a utilitarian SWF, applied to lifetime utilities, will choose outcome X+ over
outcome Y+ (41 is greater than 40) and a prioritarian SWF which is sufficiently close to
utilitarianism and which is applied to lifetime utilities will do so as well.
Kappel, however, has tried to word the case so that the pain relief produces the
very same change in sublifetime and lifetime well-being whomever we treat. He intends
that X* and Y* be represented by the sublifetime and lifetime utilities in X++ and Y++.
(I have changed the sublifetime utility of a strongly negative affect from 0 to 1, so that
the change in sublifetime and lifetime utility is 2 whether we give the pain relief to A or
B.)
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X++ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities
corresponding to outcome X*)

Person A
Person B

1
11
1

2
11
1

Time period
3
3
5

4
11
1

Lifetime
utility
36
8

Y++ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities
corresponding to outcome Y*)

Person A
Person B

1
11
1

2
11
1

Time period
3
1
7

4
11
1

Lifetime
utility
34
10

Choosing X++ over Y++ would seem impossible for a lifetime equity-regarding
welfarist to justify. Any lifetime prioritarian will choose Y++44; a lifetime sufficientist
will choose Y++ or be indifferent; and although in principle a lifetime comparativist view
might fall within my definition of equity-regarding and choose X++, that just shows the
overbreadth of that definition.
So has the lifetime welfarist been cornered? Maybe not. If X* and Y* are
accurately represented by the utility numbers in X++ and Y++, we may no longer have
the intuition that we should choose X*.
Even if we do have the intuition that we should choose X* over Y* when
represented by the utility numbers in X++ and Y++, that is not necessarily strong
evidence in favor of sublifetime welfarism, as against lifetime welfarism. The cases that
are deployed in the literature to show a preference for aiding someone at a low
sublifetime level of well-being during some period, even when she has a higher level of
lifetime well-being, all involve pain and suffering. It is difficult to construct such cases
where the well-being differentials involve the absence of a “good,” rather than an
affirmative “bad” (suffering resulting from physical pain, malnourishment, homelessness,
etc.) Imagine that B has had a life without enjoyment, and will likely lack enjoyment in
the future, but this month is enjoying himself moderately; A has had an enjoyable life in
the past, and will likely enjoy himself in the future, but this month is bored. We can
increase B’s enjoyment by some amount, or A’s enjoyment by the same amount. The
sublifetime prioritarian will say that we should increase A’s enjoyment – but that seems
counterintuitive, or at least is less strongly intuitive than giving A the pain relief in the
X* /Y* case.
A joint intuition (1) in favor of X* over Y* even when represented by the utility
numbers in X++ and Y++, but (2) to give the enjoyment to B rather than A in the
enjoyment case, is not evidence in favor of sublifetime prioritarianism. Rather it points
44

This is because Y++ is produced from X++ by effecting a Pigou-Dalton transfer in lifetime utilities,
namely transferring 2 units of lifetime utility from A, at level 36, to B, at level 8.
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beyond welfarism entirely, to a nonwelfarist duty to alleviate current pain and suffering
even when our best welfarist account (lifetime equity-regarding welfarism), would
require a different course of action. Seeing the pain cases this way could lead us to reject
welfarism. Alternatively, however, in the familiar process of “reflective equilibrium,” we
might stick by the theory of welfarism – for all the other reasons that warrant it – and see
the intuition as a real but recalcitrant one, inconsistent with the moral view that we take,
on balance, to be best justified.
3.

Sublifetime Sufficientism

We have considered challenges to lifetime welfarism in favor of, first, sublifetime
comparativism and, then, sublifetime prioritarianism. For symmetry, we should consider
a third challenge: that sufficientism is best construed in sublifetime rather than lifetime
terms.
The worry is that lifetime sufficientism seems implausible. The essence of
sufficientism is the notion that there is some threshold of well-being, above which claims
for redistribution become qualitatively weaker. What would that threshold be, in terms of
lifetime well-being? The point is not just that it would be hard to justify a particular
lifetime threshold, rather than taking it as a primitive grounded in intuitions. (After all, it
might be hard for prioritarians of any stripe to justify a particular curvature for their
SWF.) The point is rather that (I hazard to guess) most of us lack any intuitions at all
about what a “sufficient” lifetime well-being would be. Instead, intuitive thresholds tend
to be momentary or sublifetime: being well fed now, being sufficiently clothed now,
having shelter now, having enough income for this year, and so forth.
However, some sufficientists have entertained the possibility of lifetime
sufficientism. Roger Crisp, a leading proponent of sufficientism, does so.
[I claimed] that the compassion principle provides the best account of when, and why, we should
give priority to the worse off. Compassion for any being gives out, I suggested, when that being
has enough welfare, and it may be based on assessment of a being’s life as a whole or on the
individual’s position at the time of assessment.45

Equity-regarding welfarists, in short, are not compelled to choose between (1)
sufficientism, and the (2) the basic case for lifetime welfarism, given the continuity of
personal identity over time. Lifetime sufficientism incorporates both (1) and (2).
Alternatively, the equity-regarding welfarist could respond to the counterintuitiveness of
lifetime sufficientism by abandoning (1), preserving equity-regard plus a whole-life timeslice in the form of lifetime comparativism or prioritarianism.
To be sure, another response is to abandon (2) but not (1): to adopt sublifetime
sufficientism. Sublifetime sufficientism is, admittedly, intuitively more appealing than
lifetime sufficientism. Momentary or periodic well-being poverty lines seem less odd
than a lifetime well-being poverty line. On the other hand, even a momentary well-being
45

Crisp, supra note 18, at 763.
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poverty line is hard to specify-- a point borne out by the literature on poverty
measurement, where the problem of identifying the threshold of “utility” poverty is seen
as a difficult, unresolved problem. Sublifetime sufficientism, I suggest, is not a moral
view which is sufficiently powerful and unproblematic to warrant us in rejecting the basic
case for lifetime welfarism.
C. Derek Parfit: Equity-Regarding Welfarism plus Non-standard personal
identity
What if we revise the standard account of personal identity? The standard view
says that a single human being is, determinately, a single person (in normal cases) from
birth to death and that personhood and personal identity are morally significant
properties. One possible revision to this view says that different stages of a human life
are, determinately, different persons. A single human is one person from the age of zero
to 20, a different person from the age of 20 to 40, and so forth. But this view, on a little
reflection, seems unappealing. There is normally no abrupt change in psychological
abilities, or break in psychological connectedness, at any point in life (at least after the
development of basic abilities in early childhood), that would constitute the determinate
ending of the existence of one person and the beginning of another.
Derek Parfit, in his seminal book Reasons and Persons, takes a very different
tack. Parfit’s views are subtle and complicated, and I can only crudely summarize them
here. A human, at one point in time, may be more or less psychologically connected
with himself at a prior point in time -- or for that matter with a different human. A
human-at-a-time H is psychologically connected with a human-at-a-time H* if there are
links of memory, belief, desire, intention and so forth between the two. For example, H*
and H have the same belief. Or H* remembers something that H experiences. Note that
psychological connectedness is intransitive: if H* is connected with H+, and H+ with
H++, it doesn’t follow that H++ is connected with H*. A different relation is continuity,
namely the existence of overlapping chains of connectedness, which is transitive. If H*
is connected to H+, and H+ to H++, then H*, H+, and H++ are all continuous with each
other. Parfit then suggests that personal identity consists in psychological continuity
and/or connectedness with the right cause -- paradigmatically having the same brain.
46

One implication of Parfit’s account is that personal identity can be indeterminate.
It might be the case that two particular persons are neither determinately identical to each
other, nor determinately not identical. This is striking, because we normally think of the
identity relation -- at least with respect to objects such as persons -- as being determinate.

46

See PARFIT, supra note 43, at 199-347. Parfit also discusses personal identity in Comments, supra note
43; and Derek Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 292 (Raymond Martin & John
Barresi eds., 2003). For an excellent recent treatment of personal identity that discusses Parfit’s views, see
JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING 3-94 (2002). For a discussion focused on the implications of
Parfit’s account of personal identity for morality, see Bart Schultz, Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism, 96
ETHICS 721 (1986).
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Importantly for our purposes, however, Parfit does not argue that personal identity
is indeterminate within the confines of a normal human life. His examples of
indeterminacy involve esoteric cases where a spectrum of brain operations produce fewer
and fewer psychological connections, or less and less preservation of brain matter,
between consecutive stages of a human life. As for the case of a normal human life,
Parfit seems to say that personal identity over time is determinate, or at least exists to a
very high degree. He writes:
In ordinary cases, questions about our identity have answers. In such cases, there is a fact
about personal identity, and Reductionism [Parfit’s account] is one view about what kind of fact
this is. On this view, personal identity just consists in physical and/or psychological continuity. …
In the problem cases [such as the spectrum cases], things are different.47

How can Parfit say that ordinary human lives aren’t “problem cases” for personal
identity? Imagine that it is a high degree of psychological continuity, not connectedness,
that makes for a high degree of personal identity. In other words, two temporal stages of
a human life are parts of the same person, to a high degree, if the human’s brain is the
same and there is a chain of temporal stages linking the two -- such that each link in the
chain is psychologically connected to the next, to a high degree. On this version of
Parfit’s account, the absence of strong direct psychological connections between
childhood and old age would be consistent with a high degree of psychological continuity
(and hence personal identity) from childhood to old age.48
Parfit does challenge the whole lifetime account of equality, even for normal
humans -- he suggests that distributive justice may end up taking the form of a
sublifetime prioritarianism49 -- but his challenge does not involve the claim that personal
identity is normally indeterminate. Rather, the challenge rests on a different aspect of
Parfit’s account of personal identity: its reductive or deflationary character. Once we see
that personal identity, determinate or not, is reducible to facts about psychological and
physical connectedness and/or continuity, personal identity will become less significant.
“Personal identity is not what matters.”50 It will become less significant as a matter of
individual rationality: whether some experience happens to me or some other person will
be less significant in shaping my rational desires. And personal identity will become less
significant as a matter of morality. “On the Reductionist View, we believe that the fact
of personal identity over time is less deep, or involves less. We may therefore claim that
this fact has less moral importance.”51
For example, imagine two cases: one in which some person suffers a loss at one
time, and another person experiences an equal gain at a later time; a second in which one
person suffers a loss at one time, and that same person experiences an equal gain at a later
47

Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, supra note 46, at. 303.
See MCMAHAN, supra note 46, at 39-41.
49
See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 43, at 329-47; Parfit, Comments, supra note 43, at 83743, 869-72.
50
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 43, at 217.
51
Id. at 337-38.
48
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time. Standardly, egalitarian theorists see these cases as sharply distinct -- because in the
second case, it is the same person who suffers the effects, while in the first case it is two
different persons. Parfit suggests that, once we deflate personal identity to its physical
and psychological basis, our inclination to see the cases as qualitatively morally distinct
will weaken.
There are a number of reactions to this suggestion. First, it is not clear that
reducing some moral concept to its physical or psychological basis weakens the hold of
that concept. If, for example, we reduce the concept of “life” to its physical basis, does
that mean that morality must care less about killing?52 More generally, most moral
theorists now accept that moral facts supervene on physical and psychological facts -more crisply, on physical facts, since psychological facts themselves supervene on the
physical. So there is a sense in which all moral concepts -- well-being, intention, harm,
injury, choice, action -- are reducible to the physical and psychological.
This fact might mean that morality itself is less significant; but it is hard to see
how it would favor one moral view over another. In other words, Parfit’s deflationary
view of personal identity, if simply one part of a general deflation of moral properties to
psychological and physical properties, might be plausibly thought to lack implications
within morality. In particular, it might be thought not to favor sublifetime over lifetime
egalitarianism.
Second, assume that Parfit has succeeded in especially deflating the concept of a
person. We continue to care about doing the morally right thing, and (if we are
welfarists), to think of that in terms of human well-being -- even though we recognize
that, ultimately, well-being is just a matter of the arrangement of molecules -- but are less
impressed by the distinction between what occurs intrapersonally and interpersonally.
The question, then, is why we would shift from lifetime to sublifetime egalitarianism.
We might just shift to utilitarianism. The thought behind lifetime egalitarianism is that it
may be unfair to burden one person for the sake of another -- an unfairness the utilitarian
doesn’t recognize -- but that effects within a normal life do not implicate this principle,
because they are effects on the same person. Having excised or deflated the concept of
“person,” will we retain our concern for fair distribution but revise it to say that it may be
unfair to burden one moment in a human life for the sake of another? Perhaps we might
respond, instead, by saying that fair distribution -- across persons or temporal stages -- is
not important at all.
Indeed, Parfit acknowledges as much. He suggests that his account of personal
identity might plausibly change the scope of distributive principles (from lifetimes to
sublifetimes), but acknowledges that it also might change their weight.
[Distributive] principles are often held to be founded on the separateness, or non-identity, of
different persons. This fact is less deep on the Reductionist View, since personal identity is less
deep. … [I]t is [therefore] more plausible to give less weight to distributive principles. If we …
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come to believe that the unity of a life involves no more than the various relations between the
experiences in this life, it becomes more plausible to be more concerned about the quality of
experiences, and less concerned about whose experiences they are. This gives some support to the
53
Utilitarian view.

In sum, there are a range of plausible reactions that the lifetime equity-regarding
welfarist might have, once he comes to accept an account of personal identity, such as
Parfit’s, that allows for identity to be indeterminate in some cases, and that reduces it to
physical and psychological facts. One reaction is to insist that similar deflations (and
indeterminacies) can be created for all normative concepts, and to stick by his lifetime
equity-regarding view. Another is to shift to utilitarianism. Yet a third is to shift to
sublifetime equity-regarding welfarism. This third possibility is reasonable, but hardly
compelled.
III.

EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST APPROACHES TO SOCIAL CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Part I grappled with the time-slice problem. This Part raises a cross cutting
problem, namely uncertainty. Chris Sanchirico and I have engaged that problem at
length in prior work.54 We distinguish between “ex post” and “ex ante” approaches to
welfarist social choice under uncertainty, and ultimately defend the “ex post” approach.
I will not repeat our analysis but will quickly summarize the high points, specifically
focusing on the case of lifetime welfarism. The ”ex post” account of choice under
uncertainty, together with lifetime welfarism, undergirds the array of practical
prescriptions that are surveyed in Parts IV and V below.
Given certainty, each choice available to the decisionmaker can be represented as
an N-entry vector of lifetime utilities: the particular set of lifetime utilities that would
result were she to make that choice. Given uncertainty, each choice can be represented as
a set of utility vectors, or matrix: one N-entry vector for each possible prior state of the
world. The decisionmaker, we assume, can attach probabilities to these different possible
states. With those probabilities in hand, plus her social welfare function, the
decisionmaker might calculate a vector of expected utilities for each choice, and then
apply the SWF to that. This is the “ex ante” approach. Alternatively, the decisionmaker
might apply the SWF to each of the possible utility vectors, discount the SWF value of
each vector by the probability of that vector, and sum. This is the “ex post” approach.
Crucially, the “ex ante” and “ex post” methods for applying an SWF under
uncertainty can diverge. To see that possibility, and to get a better sense of how the
approaches work, consider the following, extremely simple example, involving two
persons (Jim and June), two possible choices A and B, two equiprobable states, and a
prioritarian social welfare function, w, equaling the sum of the square root of utilities.
The vectors of utilities in each state, for each choice, represent Jim’s and June’s lifetime
utilities in that state.
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Choice A
State 1
p =.5

State 2
p = .5

Jim

4

9

Jim’s expected utility = 6.5

June

0

4

June’s expected utility = 2

w(4,0) =
√4+√0= 2

w(9,4)=
√9 + √4= 5

w applied ex ante to choice A: √6.5 + √2 = 3.96
w applied ex post to choice A: 2×.5 + 5×.5 = 3.5

Choice B
State 1
p =.5

State 2
p = .5

Jim

3.5

3.5

Jim’s expected utility = 3.5

June

3.5

3.5

June’s expected utility = 3.5

w(3.5,3.5) =
√3.5+√3.5
= 3.74

w(3.5,3.5)=
3.74

w applied ex ante to choice B: √3.5 + √3.5 = 3.74
w applied ex post to choice B: 3.74×.5 + 3.74×.5 = 3.74

Consider, first, the “ex ante” approach. Using that approach, we first calculate the
vector of expected utilities for each choice, and then apply the SWF to that. Here, the
vector of expected utilities associated with choice A is (6.5, 2) and the vector associated
with choice B is (3.5, 3.5). So A is assigned a value of 3.96 (√6.5 + √2), while B is
assigned a value of 3.74 (√3.5 + √3.5).
Consider, next, the “ex post” approach. Now, we first apply our SWF in each
possible state, and then take probabilities into account, discounting each SWF value by
its probability and adding. In the case of choice A, the SWF value in state 1 is √4 + √0 =
2. The SWF value in state 2 is √9 + √4 = 5. The expected w value yielded by A is .5 x 2
+.5 x 5 = 3.5 Turning to choice B, it emerges that the ex post approach assigns that a
value of 3.74.
35

So what has happened is that the “ex ante” approach yields the judgment that
choice A is better than choice B (3.96 > 3.74), while the ”ex post” approach yields the
judgment that choice B is better than choice A (3.74 > 3.5). The “ex ante” approach
thinks of a given choice as a package of individual lotteries over outcomes, one for each
individual in the population, and aggregates the values of these lotteries to arrive at an
overall valuation of the choice. The “ex post” approach thinks of a given choice as a
package of possible outcomes (each yielding a particular distribution of utilities), and
values each outcome, then calculates an expected outcome value, to arrive at an overall
valuation of the choice. As the simple example shows, these two approaches can diverge.
Does the example generalize? Indeed it does -- quite a bit! It turns out that the
“ex ante” and “ex post” approaches can diverge for any SWF other than the utilitarian.
For any possible choice situation, the utilitarian SWF will rank choices the same way
regardless of whether we apply it “ex post” or “ex ante.” It makes no difference whether
utilitarians conceptualize choices as vectors of expected utilities, or probability
distributions over possible vectors of actual utilities. But, when we shift from
utilitarianism to equity-regarding SWFs, the two approaches are genuinely different. For
any equity-regarding SWF (comparativist, prioritarian, sufficientist), or indeed any
nonutilitarian SWF, there will be some choice situations where the two approaches yield
different recommendations.
In other words, lifetime equity-regarding welfarists must decide whether they care
about the distribution of individuals’ expected lifetime well-being, or about the expected
distribution of individuals’ lifetime well-being. These are just different approaches.
So which approach to choice under uncertainty should equity-regarding welfarists
adopt? The ex ante approach certainly has its proponents. Some welfare economists who
have written specifically about choice under uncertainty favor it. And, more generally,
much scholarship about law and policy tends to implicitly adopt it -- to think about
different policies as different package of expected utilities for the different individuals in
the population.
Sanchirico and I contend, however, that the “ex post” approach is the better
specification of welfarism -- and in this have some support in the existing literature. The
core of the argument is the “sure thing” principle: what many take to be a basic premise
of rationality, and in any event seems to be the hallmark of consequentialism. The surething principle says that, if a choice involves a probability distribution over outcomes,
and a revised choice is produced by swapping some of the outcomes for outcomes that
the decisionmaker regards as equally good (without changing their probabilities), the
decisionmaker should be indifferent between the original and revised choices. It is easy to
see that the application of an equity-regarding SWF using the ex post approach always
satisfies the sure thing principle, while the ex ante application of an equity-regarding
SWF will sometimes violate that principle. A second important argument is that the “ex
ante” approach is time-inconsistent.
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In sum: A substantial case can be made that lifetime welfarism should be outfitted
for conditions of uncertainty by adopting the “ex post” approach, which tells the
decisionmaker to maximize the expectation of her SWF (be it comparativist, prioritarian,
or sufficientist). Let us now see what lifetime welfarism, thus outfitted, implies for law
and policy.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFETIME VIEW: MEASURING EQUALITY AND POVERTY

This Part discusses what lifetime equity-regarding welfarism, together with an ex
post account of choice under uncertainty, implies for the measurement of equality and
poverty. The next Part turns to policy choice.
A.

Equality Measurement

A substantial body of empirical work in economics seeks to measure inequality.
Much of this work focuses on the equality of incomes. A close related body of work
consists of “incidence analysis”: quantifying whether taxes or other policy measures are
“regressive” or “progressive,” depending on how their burdens are borne across the
income distribution. More recently, health economists have begun to employ the equality
metrics developed in the equality-of-income literature to study the distribution of health
or longevity.
The choice between lifetime and sublifetime welfarism has direct and significant
implications for all these projects.
1.

Income Equality

Income-inequality studies -- which estimate the Gini coefficient, the coefficient of
variation, or some other quantitative measure of the degree of inequality of some
distribution of incomes -- are informational inputs for egalitarian welfarists.55 Income or
some transformation of income (such as the logarithm of income) is a measurable proxy
for well-being. At least some inequality metrics correspond to particular SWFs -- a point
stressed by Anthony Atkinson in seminal work.56 To be sure, inequality measurement
alone should not guide policy choice. A policy might produce a more equal distribution
of well-being, but with a lower total amount. Any sensible SWF should be sensitive to
both considerations, not merely the degree of inequality. But the well-established
enterprise of measuring income inequality can readily by seen, by the welfarist, as
furnishing important data for policymakers.
Most work in this area has focused on quantifying the inequality of annual
incomes. But there are many economists who believe that the inequality of lifetime
55
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income has greater normative relevance -- a position buttressed, of course, by the
arguments of this Article -- and some have sought to measure it. 57
Take lifetime income (or some transformation of lifetime income) as a proxy for
lifetime welfare. Why, in turn, isn’t the distribution of annual income a good proxy for
the distribution of lifetime income? There are (at least) two fundamental mechanisms
that drive a wedge between the equality of annual versus lifetime income.58 One is the
age distribution of earnings (and thus income). Individuals earn more as they age and
become more educated and skilled, up to a point; then, with retirement, earnings decline.
To see how this alone can produce a wedge between the equality of lifetime and annual
income, imagine that the age profile of earnings is completely fixed, and no one dies
prematurely. Everyone in the population, then, has the same lifetime earnings; but
because the population is composed of different age cohorts, earnings in any year are
unequally distributed.
The second mechanism is income mobility within age cohorts. Imagine that
everyone in the population is part of the same age cohort -- they were all born in the same
year -- and that the cohort’s mean earnings do not change at all with age. However, there
is variation around the mean. In any given year, some in the age cohort earn above the
mean, others below it. Further, there is earnings mobility -- at the extreme, whether
someone is above the mean one year does not influence whether she is above it the
following year. Then, it is easy to see, lifetime income could be much more equally
distributed than annual income.
The precise relation between the equality of lifetime and annual income will
depend, not just on income dynamics in the population, but also on the equality metric
used. Still, economists have made some progress in formalizing the point that annual
studies cannot generally be taken as good proxies for lifetime studies. Anthony Shorrocks
has shown that, for a large class of inequality measures, inequality of lifetime income can
never be greater than the average of inequality of annual income (and may be smaller, at
the limit zero).59
Is it, in fact, feasible to measure the distribution of lifetime income? How can
empirical work of this kind be undertaken? Various approaches have been used. The
most straightforward is to employ data from a longitudinal (or “panel”) dataset, where a
sample of the population is selected and then tracked over multiple years. For example,
the Swedish Level of Living Survey interviewed a large sample of Swedes over many
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years, and contains information about each individual’s income for a period of 38 years.
Anders Bjorklund calculated the Gini coefficient of the present value of individuals’ total
income over this 38-year period for different age cohorts, as well as the Gini coefficient
of annual incomes in various years. He found that the long-term Ginis were 35 to 40
percent lower than the annual Ginis.60 Similarly, Jeremy Arkes examined data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which has conducted annual interviews with the same
families since the 1960s. Arkes looked at the income of male heads of households,
comparing the Gini coefficient of the distribution of 5-year earnings for different periods
with the average of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings.61 In every comparison, 5year earnings were more equally distributed than annual earnings.
A second approach to estimating the distribution of lifetime income involves
simulation analysis.62 A third approach is to measure the distribution of some proxy for
lifetime income. Many economists take an individual’s annual consumption -- meaning
her annual expenditures on goods and services -- to be a better proxy for lifetime income
than annual income. The basic insight is that rational individuals with access to
intertemporal financial markets will “smooth” consumption over a lifetime, saving some
income in high-income periods for expenditure in later periods, and borrowing or
spending from savings to finance consumption in low-income periods. A substantial
body of empirical work has therefore examined the inequality of annual consumption, as
opposed to annual income, as a way to estimate the inequality of lifetime income.63
Does the choice between annual and lifetime income as the temporal unit for
studying income equality turn out to be a significant choice? Do empirical studies that
rely upon lifetime income as the temporal unit regularly reach substantially different
conclusions than studies that rely upon annual income? The answer, pretty clearly, is
yes. To begin, the choice clearly affects estimates of the degree of inequality. As already
mentioned, both Arkes and Bjorklund, who used longitudinal studies and the Gini
coefficient as the measure of inequality, found that lifetime or long-term income
inequality was lower than annual income inequality. More generally, virtually every
work that has applied some inequality metric to lifetime or long-term versus annual
income has reached the same result -- not surprisingly, given Shorrocks’ proof. Lifetime
inequality is always lower. We hardly live in an egalitarian world; but the world is
revealed to be less marred by inequality, once one takes the lifetime perspective, than it
appears to be from the annual perspective.
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The choice of annual versus lifetime income may lead to different conclusions,
not just about the amount of inequality in some population, but also about the change in
equality over time, or about the causes of inequality, or about the comparative degree of
inequality in different populations. Daniel Slesnick’s scholarship on consumption
provides an excellent illustration of the possible link between the choice of unit and
conclusions about equality dynamics. Many believe that the U.S. has become a less
egalitarian society in recent years, and this view is borne out by annual-income studies.
For example, the Gini coefficient of annual income decreases from the 1950s through the
late 1960s, but then changes direction and increases pretty steadily from 1970 through the
late 1990s. (This is the so-called “U-turn in income inequality”64). Slesnick challenges
this pessimistic picture with evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a crosssectional study of household consumption. Slesnick’s conclusion is as follows:
[T]he widely reported U-turn in inequality in the United States is an artifact of the inappropriate
use of family income as a measure of welfare. When well-being is defined to be a function of per
equivalent consumption, inequality either decreased over the sample period or remained
essentially unchanged depending on the choice of equivalence scales. This conclusion arises
because the distribution of consumption differs sharply from the distribution of income, which, in
turn, is due to the distribution of savings and dissavings across the population. . . .
[This conclusion] has important policy implications. The conventional wisdom is that rising
earnings inequality has been offset by income transfers until 1973. The increasing level of income
inequality since 1973 has led some analysts to the conclusion that the government must redouble
its efforts to bring about greater equality in the distribution of well-being. My results suggests that
there is no U-turn to explain and no increase in inequality to overcome.65

Much empirical work on inequality tries to illuminate the causes of inequality in
some population by decomposing overall inequality into inequality between certain
groups plus inequality within the groups. Here, too, the choice of temporal perspective
can be significant. Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri, like Slesnick, examine trends in the
inequality of annual income and consumption in the U.S. They reach conclusions similar
to Slesnick’s, namely that “despite the surge in income inequality in the
U.S., consumption inequality has increased only moderately,” and also find the following:
“[I]ncome inequality has increased substantially, both between and within groups of
households with the same characteristics (such as education, sex, and race), but even
though between-group consumption inequality has tracked between-group income
inequality quite closely, within group consumption inequality has increased much less
than within-group income inequality.” 66 Finally, for a nice illustration of the effect of
temporal perspective on comparisons of inequality between populations, consider
Christopher Flinn’s use of a simulation model to compare earnings inequality in the U.S.
with Italy, an economy where workers tend to change employers less often and have less
mobile earnings. Flinn finds that the inequality of hourly wages is three times greater in
the U.S. than in Italy, but that the inequality of lifetime earnings in the two countries is
the same.67
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2.

Incidence Studies

Economists working in the area of taxation often employ a distinctive approach to
characterizing inequality: incidence analysis. Incidence analysis predicts the distribution
of individual “tax burdens” for a given tax; calculates the individual tax burdens as a
proportion of individual income; and characterizes the tax as “regressive,”
“proportional,” or “progressive” if this fractional burden decreases, stays flat, or increases
with individual income.
Classically (as in the famous early studies by Joseph Pechman),68 the income
measure employed in incidence analysis is annual income.69 The conventional wisdom
that the personal income tax and the corporate income tax are progressive, but that their
progressive impact is largely offset by the regressive impact of payroll taxes, sales taxes,
and excise taxes, derives in substantial part from Pechman’s studies.70 Subsequent
incidence studies sometimes challenged these conclusions, but they almost invariably
followed Pechman in using the tax burden as a fraction of annual, not lifetime, income as
the basis for characterizing a tax’s regressivity or progressivity.
In a 1989 article, James Poterba challenged the annual-income perspective on tax
incidence. In line with scholarship in the inequality measurement literature, Poterba took
the view that, “[i]f households base their spending plans on their expected lifetime
income, then consumption provides a more accurate measure of lifetime resources than
does annual income.”71 He examined the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which provides
data about both household income and household consumption, and assumed (as had
Pechman) that the burden of an excise tax is borne by the consumer. Poterba then
considered the regressivity of excise taxes on gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco. The typical
expenditure on each of these items as a percentage of annual income declines steeply.
From the annual perspective, then, such taxes appear quite regressive. But the
expenditure on each of these items as a percentage of total annual expenditure declines
much less steeply. From the lifetime-income perspective (with annual consumption taken
as a proxy for lifetime income), the gasoline, alcohol and tobacco excise taxes appear
substantially less regressive.
Since Poterba’s work, some incidence scholarship has taken a lifetime perspective
by actually estimating lifetime income, rather than taking consumption as a proxy. For
example, Erik Caspersen and Gilbert Metcalf used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
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a longitudinal study, to predict lifetime income as a function of various individual
characteristics. That function was then applied to the Consumer Expenditure Survey,
enabling Caspersen and Metcalf to calculate the burden of the value added tax (VAT)
both as a fraction of annual income and as a fraction of estimated lifetime income.72 The
most ambitious work in this vein has been undertaken by Don Fullerton and Diane Lim
Rogers in their 1993 book, Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden? They use the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics to estimate wages as a function of age and other
characteristics, and incorporate these lifetime wage profiles in a general equilibrium
model.
[The model] encompasses all major U.S. taxes, many industries, ...and consumers. It is … a lifecycle model in which each individual receives a particular inheritance, a set of tax rules, a wage
profile, and a transfer profile. Each then plans an entire lifetime of labor supply, savings, goods
demands, and bequests. We also look at each industry’s use of labor, capital, and intermediate
units. We can then simulate the effects of a tax change on each economic decision through time. .
..
[W]e evaluate the effects of each U.S. tax by comparing its estimated burdens with those
of a proportional tax. … In our lifetime framework, a progressive tax is one in which the lifetime
tax burden as a fraction of lifetime income rises as lifetime income rises, and a regressive tax is
one in which the lifetime tax burden as a fraction of lifetime income falls as lifetime income
[rises]. 73

As with the companion literature on income inequality, discussed above, it is the
clear that the choice of temporal unit makes a difference to incidence analysis. Every
study which has compared lifetime and annual perspectives concludes that at least some
taxes look different from the two perspectives, sometimes quite substantially.
For example, Poterba, as stated, finds that excise taxes on gasoline, alcohol and tobacco
are less regressive in a lifetime perspective. Fullerton and Rogers find that property taxes
are progressive in an annual perspective but have a U-shaped burden in a lifetime
perspective; that the corporate income tax shifts from being progressive to being
regressive; and that the progressivity of the income tax decreases. Caspersen and Metcalf
find that the VAT is substantially less regressive in the lifetime perspective.
Davies and co-authors find that the personal income tax is less progressive.74
3.

Health Inequality

The vast majority of scholarly work that quantifies the degree of inequality in the
population distribution of some item, with an inequality metric such as the Gini
coefficient or the coefficient of variation, concerns the distribution of income (annual or
lifetime). But the approach is applicable to many other items, and the welfarist would
surely support its export to other areas. Income is hardly the sole constituent or resource
for well-being, nor the sole one which is measurable or unequally distributed.

72

See Erik Caspersen & Gilbert Metcalf, Is A Value Added Tax Regressive? Annual Versus Lifetime
Incidence Measures, 47 NAT’L TAX JOURNAL 731 (1994).
73
FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 69, at 4-5.
74
See James Davies et al., Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax Incidence, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 633 (1984).

42

C.J.L. Murray, a prominent health economist, has indeed argued that inequality
metrics should be employed to quantify the population distribution of health.75 And there
is a small, but growing, body of work in this vein.
What does the lifetime perspective imply for measurement of population health
inequality? To begin, it implies that the focus of empirical work should be the
distribution of lifetime rather than sublifetime health status -- be it momentary health
status or health status during some longer fraction of a lifetime.
An analysis by Angus Deaton and Christina Paxon, in the course of a broader
study on the correlations between age, income, and health, illustrates the momentary
approach. The Panel Study on Income Dynamics contains, inter alia, information on
“self-reported health status.” (SRHS) Respondents are asked to rate their health on a
scale from 1 to 5. SRHS values are a kind of rough proxy for momentary QALYs.76
Deaton and Paxon calculate the variance in SRHS within age cohorts.77 Although they
do not do the calculations, it would be straightforward to use the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics data to estimate the population distribution of SRHS and to measure the
inequality of that distribution.
From the lifetime perspective, however, such an approach to health-inequality
measurement is problematic. For example, imagine that lifespans are increasing in a
given country but that older individuals have more variance in SRHS, momentary
QALYs, or some other such measure of momentary health. Then the distribution of
lifetime QALYs or some other measure of lifetime health may be becoming more equal,
even though the distribution of momentary health is not. Or, imagine that a fatal disease
increases mortality in a country, and that those who survive are healthier and have less
variance in momentary health status than the pre-disease population. Then, if we use a
momentary inequality metric, it appears that the disease has reduced health inequality.
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What that calculation ignores is the inequality in lifetime health between those who die
from the disease and those who survive it.
Similar criticisms would apply to inequality measures of the distribution of
nonmomentary but sublifetime (rather than lifetime) health -- for example, the
distribution of annual QALYs in a population over the last year.
There are, in fact, health-inequality researchers who have adopted the lifetime
perspective. A number of scholars have examined the distribution of longevity. For
example, Julian Grand looked at age-at-death statistics from different countries in
(roughly) the same year. These statistics show the age at death of everyone who has died
in the country in that year. He calculated the Gini coefficient and other inequality
measures of the age-at-death distribution, for the different countries.78 Ryan D. Edwards
and Shripad Tuljapurkar compared variance of age-at-death in different countries and at
different times.79 Similar work has been undertaken by Jacques Silber and by Douglas
Hicks.80
All this scholarship employs a crude measure of lifetime health - namely, lifespan.
Lifetime QALYs would be a better measure of lifetime health. Indeed, in an important
paper, Murray and co-authors, E.E. Gakidou and J. Frenk, have proposed using the
distribution of health expectancy as the basis for studying health inequality; and one of
the WHO’s annual Health Reports adopts this approach.81 An individual’s health
expectancy is his expected lifetime health, given his risk of dying at each age, his ageconditional risk of different health states, and the value of those states on a zero-one
scale. In other words, an individual’s health expectancy is just his expected lifetime
QALYs.
The Gakidou, Murray and Frenk proposal therefore combines a lifetime
perspective with the “”ex ante” rather than “ex post” approach to social choice under
uncertainty. Part III has criticized the “ex ante” view, and the criticisms are relevant, not
merely to the Gakidou/Murray/Frenk proposal, but to the enterprise of inequalitymeasurement more generally -- as I shall now explain.
4. Inequality of Individual Expectations Versus Expected Inequality of
Attainments
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Given some inequality measure M, and some proxy for lifetime well-being X,
plus uncertainty about individual attainments with respect to X, we can measure the
inequality of individual expectations or rather the expected inequality of attainments. We
can determine the population distribution of individual expectations with respect to X,
and apply M to that; or we can determined the expected value of M, by applying M to
each possible population distribution of individual attainments, discounting by the
probability of that distribution, and summing. The inequality-of-expectations approach
maps onto an “ex ante” account of social choice under uncertainty; the expectedinequality-of-attainments approach maps onto an “ex post” account of social choice
under uncertainty.
Gakidou, Murray and Frenk argue for the inequality-of-expectations approach,
with QALYs as the proxy. They propose to measure the inequality of expected lifetime
QALYs, not the expected inequality of lifetime QALYs. Why?
One observation they make is that individuals with the same health expectancies
“may have very different healthy lifespans because of chance.”82 Imagine, at the
extreme, a birth cohort in which each baby has the same risk of dying at every age, and
the same age-conditional chance of incurring any health state, regardless of the babies’
social classes, ethnicities, genders, or other observable characteristics. In this sort of
case, expected lifetime QALYs are perfectly equal within the cohort at the time of birth,
but the lifetime QALYs actually attained by cohort members will not be equal, “because
of chance.” Some members of the cohort will die young; some will not but will suffer
burdensome diseases; some will live long, healthy lives. But it should hardly be an
ambition of egalitarian welfarists to ignore differences in well-being that are simply a
matter of chance.
Gakidou, Murray and Frenk also note that “equality of healthy lifespan could only
be realized if risks of incidence and remission of non-fatal health outcomes, and risks of
mortality, were either zero or one for the entire population.”83 Perfect equality of realized
lifetime QALYs may be impossible -- but so what? We can still measure the expected
degree of inequality in lifetime QALYs; and policymakers can still take steps to reduce
that. (Parenthetically, perfect equality of expected lifetime QALYs seems just as
unrealistic as perfect equality of realized lifetime QALYs.)
A further worry about focusing on the distribution of realized, rather than
expected, lifetime QALYs is this. How can we employ that approach to measure future
health inequality? As described above, scholars such as Le Grand, Edwards and
Tuljapurkar, Silber, and Hicks have examined age-at-death statistics to determine the
distribution of realized lifespan in a past population; but, given uncertainty about the
future, what would it mean to measure the distribution of realized lifespan, or realized
lifetime QALYs, in a future population? The answer, here, is that the expected-inequality
of-attainments framework is robust to uncertainty, for example, uncertainty about what
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the health of future cohorts will be. Indeed, integrating a concern for equality with
uncertainty is the very point of both this framework as well as the competing equality-ofexpectations approach. Neither framework assumes certainty, or is merely retrospective.
We can use current information to estimate the probability of different possible
population distributions of longevity or lifetime QALYs; measure the degree of
inequality in each such distribution, for example by using the Gini coefficient; and then
calculate the expected degree of inequality across possible distributions, for example, the
expected Gini coefficient of realized longevity or lifetime QALYs.
The choice between inequality-of-individual-expectations and expectedinequality-of-attainments has been most clearly highlighted by Gakidou, Murray and
Frenk, who are health researchers, but scholars working on income inequality must
confront the same question. In estimating (say) the Gini coefficient of the inequality of
lifetime income in some population, should researchers estimate the Gini coefficient of
expected lifetime income, or the expected Gini coefficient of lifetime income? Note that
the question arises most obviously with respect to the prediction of future income
equality; but it also lurks under the surface of retrospective work, given measurement
error. Similarly, lifetime tax-incidence analysis might focus on the expected lifetime tax
burden as a fraction of expected lifetime income; or on the probability distribution of
possible incidence scenarios, in each of which individuals at different lifetime income
levels incur some tax burden.
B.

Poverty Measurement

Poverty measurement, like the companion field of inequality measurement, is a
large area of research within empirical economics.84 Development economists, in
particular, have devoted considerable effort to quantifying poverty, but work in the field
also extends to the United States and other developed countries. Much existing research
focuses on income poverty: measuring the extent to which a population is impoverished
in virtue of its low incomes. The standard methodology starts by defining a poverty line:
either an absolute poverty line, often meaning the amount of income required to purchase
sufficient food to avoid malnutrition; or a relative poverty line, meaning some low
percentile of the population’s income distribution (for example, the 20th percentile).85
The poverty index is then some function of the number of individuals below the poverty
line, their incomes, and the size of the whole population. Two simple indices are the
headcount ratio (the fraction of the population which is impoverished); and the poverty
gap (the average shortfall between the income of each impoverished person and the
poverty line). More sophisticated indices are also available. Measures within the class
of so-called Foster,Greer, and Thorbecke indices, which take the form
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1/N∑ [(Z-Xi)/Z]α, α ≥0, with Xi the individual’s income and Z the poverty line, are most
commonly used.86
What are the implications, here, of lifetime welfarism? As suggested earlier, the
lifetime view might be seen to undermine the variant of equity-regarding welfarism -sufficientism -- which most directly supports the practice of poverty measurement.87
Lifetime sufficientism would be defined around a single threshold level of lifetime wellbeing that would make a categorical difference with respect to redistributive claims.
Identifying that lifetime level is not an easy matter. Consider the criterion of being wellnourished -- the typical basis in practice for setting absolute poverty lines. Someone who
is badly nourished at all moments throughout a lifetime is impoverished with respect to
lifetime well-being -- but this sets the poverty threshold extremely low, and makes
sufficientism collapse to utilitarianism for the vast majority of the population. At the
other extreme, the fact that an individual is hungry once in her life can hardly mean that
she falls in the class of lifetime “poor” individuals who have stronger redistributive
claims on the rest of the population. And any cutoff percentage Q which is greater than 0
and less than 1, which purports to define the percentage of moments that an individual
must be malnourished to be lifetime malnourished, may well seem arbitrary -- arbitrary in
a way that the basic notion of being malnourished is not.
In short, the lifetime view may radically change the theoretical basis for the field
of poverty measurement. This is not to say that the field would disappear. Poverty
measures can provide important information for utilitarians, prioritarians, and
comparativists, not just for sufficientists. For example, an income-poverty line might
track qualitative changes in the welfare productivity of money. The marginal utility of
income might decrease dramatically at the point at which income suffices to purchase
basic nourishment. But abandoning sufficientism would mean that poverty measurement
would need to locate some other philosophical justification within welfarism, and in
particular that the poverty line could not be set with reference to some morally basic cutoff level of well-being. Giving up sufficientism means giving up that notion.
Still, it is possible to marry sufficientism with the lifetime perspective on wellbeing. As mentioned earlier, Roger Crisp, a leading proponent of sufficientism,
entertains just this possibility.88 Poverty measurement rooted in lifetime sufficientism
would naturally be focused on the distribution of lifetime income in some population (or
the distribution of some proxy for lifetime income) and a poverty line defined in terms of
lifetime income (or some proxy).
This is not a utopian idea. Poverty researchers, like inequality researchers,
generally employ short-term measures of income; but, as in the inequality field, there
actually is a reasonably substantial body of scholarship that attempts to take a longerterm view. The rubric for this work is the study of “chronic” rather than “transient”
86

See Udo Ebert & Patrick Moyes, A Simple Axiomatization of the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke Poverty
Orderings, 4 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 455, 456 (2002).
87
See supra Part II.B.3.
88
See id..

47

poverty.89 Much of this research employs longitudinal data, with chronic poverty
defined either in terms of multi-period income (or consumption), or in terms of the
frequency with the individual is below the periodic income (or consumption) poverty
line. For example, Jyotsana Jalan and Martin Ravallion examined panel data over six
years from China, which provided information about a household’s consumption and
other characteristics.90 They defined a household’s chronic poverty to be the squared
poverty gap between its mean consumption over the six years and the annual poverty
line. Since annual consumption was normalized by the annual poverty line, this is the
same as taking the squared poverty gap between a household’s normalized six-year
consumption and a six-year poverty line equaling six times the annual poverty line. Jalan
and Ravallion also calculated “transient” poverty, defined as the difference between the
household’s average squared poverty gap and its chronic poverty. Raghav Gaiha and
Anil Deolalikar used panel data from India over 9 years, and determined whether the
household was below the annual income poverty line for zero, one, or more years. Some
households, the most “persistently” poor, had annual incomes below that line for all nine
years.91
A different approach, again paralleling inequality-measurement techniques, is to
employ a proxy for long-term poverty. For example, the depth of poverty in one period
might be taken as a crude measure of whether the household’s long-term income is above
or below some long-term line.92 Or annual consumption might be used. Slesnick
examined not only consumption inequality in the U.S., but consumption poverty as
well93; and Krishna Pendakur examined consumption poverty in Canada.94
If individuals’ annual incomes were completely immobile, annual income would
be no worse an indicator of lifetime well-being than lifetime or long-term income, and
poverty studies could use a long- or short-term income time slice interchangeably. The
immobility premise is, of course, false, and studies of chronic poverty therefore reach
distinctive conclusions: about the extent of poverty, its causes and correlates, and policy
responses. For example, Javan and Ravllion find that the amount of poverty would be
reduced by half if transient poverty were excluded; that one of the four Chinese provinces
studied had a much higher proportion of transient poverty than the others; and that, when
a household’s chronic and transient poverty were regressed on household characteristics,
the determinants of the two were quite different. Slesnick, in the U.S. context, finds that
the percentage of the population suffering consumption poverty is substantially lower
than the percentage that are counted as impoverished using traditional annual-income
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measures, and that consumption poverty (by contrast with the traditional measure) has
decreased over time.
More generally, the picture from multiple studies suggests that:
[C]hronic poverty … is strongly associated with disadvantages that are difficult to
reverse quickly such as a lack of assets (physical and human ….), being trapped in lowproductivity activities …, a high dependency ratio[], and location in remote or otherwise
disadvantaged areas. Transient poverty by contrast is more typically associated with cases where
households have very little ability to insure themselves against fluctuations due to either external
factors such as prices, climate or job availability, or household level shocks such as serious illness
or death.95
As for policy implications, the literature on chronic poverty suggests – very crudely –
that government policies such as unemployment insurance, good health care coverage,
worker retraining, or disaster relief, will be applauded by the sublifetime sufficientist, but
will be viewed more skeptically by the lifetime sufficientist. These policies may help
many whose short-term well-being is episodically low, without doing much for the badly
educated, socially isolated, and low-asset portion of the population whose long-term
well-being is low.
I have, until now, bracketed issues of uncertainty -- but those must inevitably be
confronted by poverty researchers, as in the companion field of inequality measurement.
Given some proxy for lifetime well-being X (such as lifetime income), some poverty line
Z, and some poverty measure M, we might calculate M as a function of Z and individual
expectations with respect to X; or, alternatively, we might calculate the expectation of M,
that is, the expected degree to which individuals’ actual attainments with respect to X fall
short of Z. The first approach corresponds to the “ex ante” account of social choice under
uncertainty; the second, to the “ex post” approach. A number of researchers have taken
the first approach. For example, Gaiha and Deolalikar inter alia employ a regression
model to determine the household’s expected income, and calculate poverty as a function
of household expected income.96 But it would be better -- if the “ex post” account is
correct -- to try to estimate the probability of different possible distributions of long-term
income in the population of interest, and then to calculate the expected degree of poverty
as a probability-weighted average of the poverty measure applied to each of these
possible income distributions.97
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V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFETIME VIEW: CHOOSING POLICIES

Here, I discuss the implications of lifetime equity-regarding welfarism for policy
choice. Rather than discussing the implications in particular policy domains (education,
environmental law, health care, natural hazards, unemployment insurance, etc.), which
would consume many articles, I approach the issue in a more general way. First, I look at
the implications for redistributive taxation. The credentials of the tax system, as a
redistributive mechanism, are unimpeachable. Then, I examine the implications for the
well-known view, pressed by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell and others, that the tax
system is the sole legal mechanism appropriately employed for redistribution, regardless
of the SWF. Finally (because there are plausible grounds to dispute this view), I examine
the implications for the policy-analytic tools we might use to evaluate the equity effects
of non-tax policies: in particular, “suspect class” analysis and the development of
integrated policy-analytic tools that will be sensitive to both overall well-being and
equity.
A.

Redistributive Taxes

Debates about the appropriate tax structure, for example the long-running debate
about consumption versus income taxation, are commonplace both in various scholarly
fields and in the political process. Equity-regarding welfarism suggests that the first-best
technique for choosing among tax regimes is by specifying a SWF, or range of SWFs,
and comparing possible regimes in light of this function(s). The traditional criteria for
evaluating tax policy, such as “horizontal equity” or “vertical equity” or “ability to pay,”
are second-best, proxy criteria, which are justifiably employed in some contexts given the
computational demands of the first-best technique.98 The choice between sublifetime and
lifetime perspectives has direct relevance, both to the proxy criteria and to first-best
policy evaluation by application of a SWF.
Start with the proxy criteria. Horizontal equity means equal tax burdens for
similarly situated individuals. Vertical equity means different tax burdens for differently
situated individuals. A standard way to define an individual’s “situation,” for purposes of
these criteria, is in terms of her income. This makes sense, for welfarists, given the role
of income as an important determinant of well-being. Horizontal equity then requires
that individuals with equal incomes bear equal tax burdens, and vertical equity that
individuals with greater incomes pay more tax (at least in absolute and perhaps fractional
terms) -- since the utilitarian and, a fortiori, the equity-regarding welfarist will favor
some transfers of income (bracketing disincentive effects) from rich to poor. Adopting a
lifetime view of well-being, in turn, motivates a definition of horizontal and vertical
equity in terms of lifetime income rather than sublifetime well-being. As Fullerton and
Rogers explain, “[T]he lifetime perspective provides a useful yardstick to help evaluate
any … tax system. For ‘horizontal equity,’ two individuals with similar lifetime incomes
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should pay similar total lifetime taxes. In addition, for ‘vertical equity,’ higher lifetime
incomes should be associated with higher lifetime tax burdens.99”
The temporal framing of horizontal and vertical equity norms clearly affects
whether particular regimes are seen as more or less “equitable” in light of these norms.
Consider the most obvious example: William Vickrey’s well-known proposal for
cumulative income taxation.100
A cumulative tax system consists of a final tax schedule that specifies total tax payments and of
procedures for collecting tax payments along the way . . . Vickrey proposed that the final tax
schedule be derived from the existing annual tax schedule by calculating for any total income the
tax that would have been paid under the annual tax schedule if the total income had been earned in
equal amounts in each of the years of the averaging period. Total income was to be calculated as
the sum of annual taxable income over the averaging period plus an imputation of accumulated
interest on tax payments made through the averaging period.101

Making the averaging period an entire lifetime is what horizontal equity, framed in terms
of equal taxation for individuals with equal lifetime incomes, would require.102 Under
the current income tax system in the U.S., which uses an annual period for measuring
income and increasing rather than constant marginal rates, two individuals with identical
lifetime incomes can readily pay different lifetime taxes depending on the temporal
pattern of income. A very simple example103: Imagine that the marginal tax rates are
10% for the first $30,000 of income and 30% for income thereafter. A and B live for two
years. A has a fluctuating income and earns $10,000 in the first year and $90,000 in the
next, while B has a constant income and earns $50,000 in both years. Then A will owe
$1,000 in taxes in the first year and $21,000 in the second, for a total of $22,000, while B
will owe $9,000 in taxes in each year, for a total of $18,000. A therefore owes more in
total taxes than B, even though both have identical lifetime incomes. From an annual
perspective, horizontal equity framed in income terms is simply inapplicable to A and B - who have different incomes in both years -- but from a lifetime perspective the
differential treatment of A and B appears arbitrary. As Vickrey explained, “no taxpayer
should bear a heavier or lighter burden merely because certain items of his income
happen to be earned or realized in one year or another …”104 Vickrey’s system ensures
that individuals with equal total lifetime incomes will pay an equal present value of taxes.
Specifying the horizontal-income-equity norm in terms of lifetime rather than
annual income would also argue for adopting Vickrey-like averaging mechanisms for any
99
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income-based tax or transfer program. Lily Batchelder argues for multi-year averaging in
calculating the Earned Income Tax Credit.105 Jeffrey Liebman notes that workers with
identical lifetime earnings can pay different amounts of Social Security Tax, which is a
constant percentage but has a cap.106 A pure welfare program, designed just to alleviate
poverty -- understood in lifetime rather than annual terms -- might well key annual
payments to cumulative income, not annual income. 107
A lifetime-income specification of traditional horizontal- or vertical-equity tax
norms not only strengthens the case for Vickrey-style income-averaging structures, which
in actual practice have been rarely adopted.108 That specification may also change how
commonplace tax structures are evaluated in light of horizontal or vertical equity norms.
Indeed, the main function of lifetime-incidence studies of tax structures is to inform such
evaluation. As Fullerton and Rogers explain:
A misconception here is that the lifetime perspective mandates lifetime accounting to calculate
current tax liability. Not so. Tax collections can still be based on annual accounts. But the
lifetime perspective provides a useful yardstick to help evaluate any such tax system.109

Consider the choice between the VAT and the existing income tax. The VAT is
regressive in terms of annual income, while the existing income tax is progressive. The
VAT is substantially less regressive in terms of lifetime income, while the existing
income tax is less progressive. So the “vertical equity” argument for the existing income
tax, over the VAT, weakens when we take the position that individuals are differently
situated for purposes of “vertical equity” when they have different lifetime (not annual)
incomes.
To be sure, for egalitarian welfarists, the proxy criteria are just that -- rough
indices that economize on evaluation costs but can also produce errors. Individuals with
equal lifetime incomes will not necessarily have equal lifetime utilities. In particular -- a
point stressed by the scholarly literature on Vickrey’s proposal110 -- individuals with
equal lifetime income may end up with different consumption sequences (pace classic
economic wisdom) and therefore different levels of lifetime well-being. One response is
to rework the notions of horizontal and vertical equity, defining them in terms of some
function of consumption rather than income. Another is to move to first-best analysis. In
fact, tax-policy scholarship is one area where policy proposals are regularly evaluated
through the application of a SWF. The practice of doing so goes back to Mirlees’ work,
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on optimal taxation.111 In this context, the lifetime perspective counsels -- of course that the SWF be defined as a function of lifetime utilities.
Some optimal-tax scholarship does exactly this. For example, Jeffrey Liebman
studied a version of Vickrey’s income-averaging proposal.112 He assumes a population
of three types of individuals, with steady, declining, or rising earnings over time. The
individuals, in one scenario, smooth their consumption; in the other, they are “present
focused” and consume the earnings when realized. Given a utilitarian SWF, Vickrey
taxation is always better than an annual income tax in the smoothing scenario; whether it
is in the “present-focused” scenario depends on the proportion of the three types of
individuals. Liebman, then, compares the two tax structures using an equity-regarding
SWF that depends on the lifetime utilities of the three types of individuals. The specific
results depend on the parameters of the SWF but -- as it turns out -- tend to be similar to
the utilitarian case. These conclusions about the effect of Vickrey averaging may or may
not hold up with further analysis; my point, here, is to endorse Liebman’s lifetimefocused methodology for optimal-tax modeling.
B.

Should Non-Tax Instruments be Used for Redistribution?

Kaplow and Shavell have published a series of influential articles arguing that the
income tax system rather than non-tax legal rules, such as tort doctrines, should be used
to redistribute income.113 Their work is closely related to a body of scholarship in
applied economics which argues against the use of “distributive weights” in cost-benefit
analysis.114
An important analytic step in this work, certainly in Kaplow and Shavell’s,
involves Pareto-superiority. Imagine that a government decisionmaker is considering
two non-tax policy options, PEquity and PK-H. The two options could, for example, be
different sets of legal doctrines, or different regulations, or different expenditures on
public goods. The decisionmaker has in hand an equity-regarding SWF, which favors
PEquity. But PK-H is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to PEquity: those who benefit from PK-H
could compensate those who are made worse off, via costless lump-sum transfers,
making everyone better off than with PEquity.
What is the argument for choosing PK-H? One line of argument is not persuasive:
namely that PK-H, coupled with perfect redistributive taxation, is a Pareto improvement
relative to PEquity. By “perfect redistributive taxation,” I mean just a system of costless
lump-sum transfers -- one that has zero administrative costs and has no effect on
111

See James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON.
STUD. 175 (1971).
112
See Liebman, supra note 101.
113
See in particular Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency
vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income
Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981).
114
See Olof Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis--Should We Forget About
Them?, 81 LAND ECON. 337, 338-39 (2005) (citing sources).

53

individuals’ welfare except to increase or decrease their holdings by the amount taxed or
granted. The problem with this argument is that the actual tax system is imperfect, given
administrative costs and hidden information.
Kaplow’s and Shavell’s contribution was to show that, in a class of cases, PK-H,
coupled with a kind of imperfect taxation, will be Pareto-superior to PEquity. They focus
on the income tax -- which is imperfect because it creates a disincentive to work. They
show that, under certain conditions, where a legal rule is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient, the
adoption of an efficient alternative together with matching changes in income tax rates
will leave work incentives unchanged and raise a surplus -- which can be distributed in
lump-sum form, making everyone better off than with the inefficient rule.
For their result to go through, Kaplow and Shavell have to assume that income,
labor effort, and other characteristics enter into individual utility functions in a particular
way. The debate, within legal scholarship, about their argument has largely focused on
these assumptions.115 The question, in effect, is about the conditions under which a
Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy can be converted into a Pareto-superior policy.
I want to come at the issue from a different direction. The lifetime perspective
clarifies the kind of Pareto-superiority that arguments such as Kaplow and Shavell’s need
to establish.
The crucial point to see is that the four different variants of equity-regarding
welfarism, defined by different answers to the time-slice problem and different views of
how social welfare functions should be applied under conditions of uncertainty, generate
four corresponding -- and distinct -- senses of Pareto-superiority.

Different Variants of Pareto Superiority Corresponding to Different
Variants of Equity-Regarding Welfarism
What is the Correct Approach to
Social Choice Under Uncertainty?

What is the
Correct Time
Slice?

Ex Ante

Ex Post

Sublifetime

EA-S (Ex Ante
Sublifetime)
Pareto Superiority

EP-S (Ex Post
Sublifetime)
Pareto Superiority

Lifetime

EA-L (Ex Ante
Lifetime)
Pareto Superiority

EP-L (Ex Post
Lifetime)
Pareto Superiority
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In particular, if one adopts the view argued for here -- the combination of lifetime
welfarism and an “ex post” approach to social choice under uncertainty -- the matching
sort of Pareto superiority is ex post, lifetime Pareto superiority. For short, let’s call this
EP-L Pareto superiority. A policy P* is EP-L Pareto superior to alternative P if, in every
state of the world, at least some individuals would have greater lifetime well-being if P*
were chosen than they would if P were chosen, and no individual would have lower
lifetime well-being if P* were chosen.
Along the temporal dimension, EP-L Pareto superiority is a relaxed notion of
Pareto superiority. EP-sublifetime Pareto-superiority is more stringent. To see this
point, consider any lifetime view that ascribes sublifetime as well as lifetime utilities.116
Let us bracket uncertainty for the moment, and imagine that we have two, certain
outcomes O and O*, and various individuals. In some periods (e.g., some years), some
individuals are worse off in O* than in O. However, no one has lower lifetime wellbeing in O*, and some have higher lifetime well-being. Sublifetime welfarists who
accept the basic intuition of the Pareto principle can deny that O* is better than O.
Paretian sublifetime welfarists would say that O* is Pareto superior to O only if, in every
period, no individual is worse off in O* and some are better off. But lifetime welfarists
surely cannot construe the Pareto principle so stringently. Lifetime welfarists think of
well-being as an attribute of a whole human life. Paretians find it hard to see how an
outcome that makes everyone better off could be a worse outcome. Lifetime welfarists
might deny the Pareto principle; what is very hard to see is why they would accept it but
insist on Pareto superiority in each period taken individually. In short, lifetime welfarists
must count O* as a Pareto improvement over O -- in accordance with the EP-L construal
of Pareto superiority.
Genuine Pareto improvements are therefore easier to secure for lifetime welfarists
than for sublifetime welfarists. If one outcome produces greater sublifetime well-being
for some, and no less for anyone, in every period, then it surely is Pareto superior in
terms of lifetime well-being; but an outcome can be Pareto superior in terms of lifetime
well-being without being Pareto superior in each period, as in the example just discussed.
Along the dimension of uncertainty, by contrast, EP-L Pareto superiority is a
stringent notion of Pareto superiority. EP-L Pareto superiority demands that policy P* be
a Pareto-improvement over P in every possible state of the world. I am relying, here, on
Savage’s classic framework for formalizing choice under uncertainty. The
decisionmaker expresses her uncertainty as a probability assignment to a set of possible
states (where a “state” might be understood as a completely prior history of the world
plus a set of possible causal laws). Each possible action is a mapping which assigns an
outcome to each possible state. EP-L Pareto superiority requires that, for each possible
state, the outcome that would occur if P* were chosen be a Pareto improvement over the
outcome that would occur if P were chosen. In each state, some individuals must have
greater lifetime well-being in the outcome that results from P*, and none may have lower
lifetime well-being.
116
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Why EP-L Pareto superiority? Why not ex ante-lifetime Pareto superiority (EA-L
dominance), which says that P* is Pareto-superior to P if some have greater expected
lifetime well-being with P* and none have lower expected lifetime well-being? If P* is
EP-L Pareto-superior to P, then any SWF which respects the Pareto principle in its
ranking of outcomes, and is applied in accordance with the correct account of choice
under uncertainty -- the ex post account-- will prefer P* to P. By contrast, EA-L Pareto
superiority doesn’t guarantee that. Indeed, in our work on choice under uncertainty,
Sanchirico and I highlight a stronger and counterintuitive result: For any continuous
SWF which respects the Pareto principle in its ranking of outcomes and the Pigou-Dalton
principle, there will be at least one pair of policies P+ and P++ such that P+ is EA-L
Pareto superior to P++ but P++ is actually preferred by the SWF, if applied in accordance
with the ex post approach, to P+.117
Return, now, to the question of using tax versus non-tax instruments to engage in
redistribution. Those who argue that policymakers in some non-tax domain should
ignore distributive considerations, and assert -- as do Kaplow and Shavell -- that this
claim holds true regardless of the form of the SWF, must show that efficient policies in
the domain can be converted, via the stipulated tax instrument, into EP-L Pareto-superior
policies. Unless they can make that showing, the assertion that any Paretian equityregarding SWF will prefer the efficient policy together with compensating tax changes
will be untrue.
For a dramatic illustration of the point, consider risk regulation. Imagine that
everyone in a reasonably large group of individuals is at risk of dying from a pollutant, a
workplace hazard, a dangerous product, or some other risk source. A policy P prevents
some premature deaths in the group, at some cost in consumption both to group members
and nonmembers. Our equity-regarding SWF prefers P to a less interventionist policy
P*. However, because the choice of P* simply increases the risk of death for group
members, it is quite possible that P* is ex ante Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to P. P*
reduces each group member’s expected lifetime well-being by some amount (by
increasing the fatality risks to which group members are subject); P* increases the
expected well-being of non-members by some amount (by increasing their consumption);
and it is quite possible that there is a costless lump-sum redistribution of money, from
group nonmembers to group members, such that P* coupled with this redistribution
increases everyone’s expected well-being as compared to P.
Imagine that our income tax system, despite its imperfections, is good enough to
actually accomplish ex ante Paretian redistribution. P*, together with income tax
adjustments, is EA-L Pareto-superior to P. It doesn’t follow that P* is EP-L Paretosuperior to P. After all, some group members will die prematurely as a result of P*. All
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group members receive tax transfers such that the expected increase in each member’s
utility produced by the transfer exceeds the expected loss in his utility associated with his
higher fatality risk. But, in any state of the world in which some group member dies
earlier as a result of P*, he loses the entire utility difference between full life and
premature death, and gains only the transfer. In that state, he might well be worse off as
a result of P*-plus-transfer. Indeed, if the deaths at issue are instantaneous -- so that the
transfer occurs after his death -- he will surely be worse off than if policy P had been
implemented. So it is not, in fact, guaranteed that every equity-regarding SWF, if
applied in an ex post manner, will prefer P*-plus-transfer to P. In some states,
individuals are worse off (those who die prematurely) and inequality may be widened
(between them and everyone else).
It might be objected that a sufficiently well-functioning tax system could convert
an efficient policy that imposes an increased risk of death on some group into an EP-L
Pareto-superior policy. But such a system would be fantastical: it would have to sort
within the group, identifying those who actually will die in a given state, and targeting
payments to them in that state (payments that must occur sufficiently long before they die
to compensate for premature death).
To conclude, I should stress that this Section does not show that non-tax
instruments should in fact be used for redistribution. It may be true that, with a particular
SWF or family of SWFs in hand, we can show why policy choices in some domain
should be made with reference to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, leaving distributive
considerations to the tax system. But Kaplow and Shavell offer a different argument
against non-tax redistribution, one that can apply to all equity-regarding SWFs (more
precisely, all that accept the Pareto principle for outcomes) because the argument invokes
Pareto superiority. The thrust of this Section is to clarify the requisite structure of this sort
of argument.
C.

Distributively Sensitive Policy Analysis
1.

Anti-Discrimination Norms, Disparate Impact Tests, and Protected
Classes

Public law in the U.S. employs anti-discrimination norms and, to a lesser extent,
disparate impact tests to constrain governmental policy choices. An anti-discrimination
norm covers policies that facially refer to, or are designed to injure, certain suspect
groups, subjecting such policies to a heightened burden of justification. The Equal
Protection Clause protects racial minorities and women via an anti-discrimination norm.
A disparate impact test demands heightened justification for nondiscriminatory laws that
disproportionately harm members of a suspect class, as opposed to nonmembers. Under
current doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause does not proscribe disparate impact.
However, various nonconstitutional sources of law ground disparate impact tests
applicable to governmental actors -- for example, Title VI, or Executive Order 12898 --
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and measuring disparate impact with respect to racial minorities and low-income groups
is a key focus of the literature on “environmental justice.” 118
Discrimination norms and disparate impacts test are -- for the equity-regarding
welfarist -- the non-tax analogues of notions of horizontal and vertical equity. They are
proxy tests. “Suspect” or “protected” classes are groups of individuals who tend to be
badly off with respect to well-being; policies that widen the welfare gap between them
and the rest of society, either through explicit discrimination or disparate impact, are
likely to be rejected by any sensible SWF absent a sufficient countervailing gain to
overall welfare.
What are the implications of lifetime welfarism for anti-discrimination and
disparate impact tests? To begin, it should be noted that the shift from a sublifetime to a
lifetime framework does not substantially change the case for recognizing race and
gender as suspect classifications. In a society where law or social norms stigmatize
blacks as second-class citizens, or one where such norms have evaporated but existed in
the recent past, the status of racial minority correlates with a lower level of both
sublifetime and lifetime well-being. A similar account can be given with respect to
gender.
Lifetime welfarism does affect the meaning of low-income status, for purposes of
environmental-justice measures or other tests that recognize low-income groups as
“suspect.” Bracketing measurement costs, the best specification of the low-income class
looks to lifetime, not temporal income. Indeed, in the empirical literature that tries to
quantify disparate impact along an income gradient, some of the newer work focuses on
lifetime income.119
Let us turn, now, to the status of age as a protected class -- for it is here that
lifetime and sublifetime welfarism diverge most dramatically. Within sublifetime
welfarism, the case for viewing age as a protected class is strong. Age correlates with
lower levels of momentary well-being, once age is sufficiently advanced. Certainly it is
plausible that (say) 80-year olds tend to have a lower level of momentary well-being than
35-year olds: because of health problems, lower incomes, and social isolation. So
redistributing health care or income from the 80-year to the 35-year old is, from a
momentary perspective, a transfer from badly off to better off.
By contrast, from the lifetime perspective, age should not be a suspect class. The
average lifetime well-being of 80-year-olds is greater than the average lifetime wellbeing of 35-year olds -- since the 80-year-olds will end up living longer, on average, than
the 35-year-olds.
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So what is the relevant suspect class? Youth? Will the lifetime welfarist view
policies that discriminate against older individuals as a kind of affirmative action for the
young? Some lifetime welfarists have actually defended this position.120 To see why the
position is incorrect, or at least much too crude, it is important to remember that lifetime
welfarism should be married with an ex post, rather than ex ante, approach to social
choice under uncertainty.
Consider a policy that imposes a tax on 80-year-olds to benefit 35-year-olds.
Some of the 35-year-olds will live to be 80; some will die before 80, but live to
experience many years of adulthood; a small fraction will die only a few years after
reaching 35. Call these subgroups of the 35-year-olds subgroups A, B, and C. The
policy (if kept in place permanently) simply shifts resources within the lives of the
individuals in subgroup A, and may well harm rather than benefit them by doing so.
Many individuals who live to advanced ages have a lifetime health and consumption
profile that could be improved by shifting resources to later in life; the policy, in its effect
on subgroup A, works in the opposite direction. Subgroup B is benefited by the policy
(bracketing incentive effects), because they reap its benefits but will never live to be
subject to the tax. Yet the individuals in subgroup B will have reasonably long lives.
Shifting resources from the 80-year-olds to them may not be counted -- depending on the
shape of the SWF -- as a large improvement in social welfare. It is a redistribution from
the rich (in terms of lifetime well-being) to the merely prosperous.
In transferring resources from the 80-year-olds to subgroup C, the policy does
work a clear redistributive benefit. But subgroup C may be only a small fraction of the
total group of 35-year olds. The redistributive benefit of shrinking the gap between their
lifetime well-being, and that of the 80-year olds, may not justify the overall costs of the
policy -- administrative costs, reduced lifetime well-being of current 80 year olds, and
reduced lifetime well-being of the 35-year olds who will live to be 80.
So, from the lifetime perspective, age is not a good candidate for a suspect class,
but neither is youth -- at least in a society like the U.S. where many of the young will end
up becoming fairly old. Within lifetime welfarism, the characteristic that generates
redistributive claims is lifetime well-being; the lower the individual’s level of lifetime
well-being, the stronger her redistributive claim. Since neither the attribute of being old,
nor the attribute of being young, is strongly correlated with having a low level of lifetime
well-being, neither the old nor the young should be a “suspect” class for purposes of
proxy tests that roughly implement lifetime welfarism.
A better candidate for “suspect” status -- odd as this may sound -- is lifespan.
Longevity is not, of course, the sole determinant of lifetime well-being. Individuals with
equal lifespans can surely end up at different lifetime welfare levels, if the experiential,
health, or social components of their lives are different. Longevity is simply one
dimension of well-being. But longevity has the special property of being, not just a
dimension of well-being, but a precondition as well. Dead individuals don’t have social
lives, pleasant experiences, meaningful careers, and so on. This strengthens the case for
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thinking of the attribute of having a short lifespan as “suspect.” However much
happiness and love is jammed into a life that ends at age five, that unfortunate child will
end up much worse off in terms of lifetime flourishing than most others in her society.
Those at the bottom of the lifespan distribution are a kind of impoverished group,
analogous in this respect to those at the bottom of the (lifetime) income distribution, or
those who bear the lifetime burden of being socially stigmatized as second-class citizens.
Should legal doctrine actually recognize the short-lifespanned as “suspect” for
purposes of equality tests? That proposal is less outrageous than it may seem at first
blush. Explicit discrimination against the short-lifespanned does not, of course, occur.
But policies can have a disparate impact on them -- most obviously, policies that increase
juvenile mortality. (Consider a policy to terminate funding for some health care measure
targeted at a serious, possibly fatal, disease among infants and juveniles. Those who
would be harmed by this policy are, disproportionately, short-lifespanned, as compared to
those who would be benefited.).
The insight that short lifespan constitutes a kind of lifetime well-being poverty
can also be integrated into policy choice in other ways than through a “disparate impact”
test. For example, agencies undertaking cost-benefit analysis might use a greater
monetary valuation of life for children’s lives. Or, reducing juvenile mortality might be
generally taken as a high-priority goal of health care and development policy. To a
substantial extent, policymakers do already appreciate the distributive significance of
reducing juvenile mortality; but there is no consensus basis for doing so within the
scholarly literature on equality and poverty. As David Hulme and Andrew Sheppard
explain:
A key conceptual challenge for the study of chronic poverty …. is how to treat those who
die preventable deaths. These need to be incorporated in our analysis as they experience the most
acute form of deprivation…. This must be included or a household whose young children die may
be reported as escaping poverty when a similar household that manages to raise all its children …
is seen as ‘failing’ to escape from poverty as its income/consumption levels per capita are lower
because of its larger size and higher dependency ratio. .. . Concepts from the health sciences, such
as disability adjusted life years [a kind of QALY], may provide a basis for starting to think
121
through this theoretical frontier.

Lifetime welfarism provides a firm normative basis for the cutting-edge poverty
measures that Hulme and Sheppard propose, and for policy tests that give extra weight to
lifesaving among the young -- be these in the form of proxies and presumptions, or in the
form of more a systematic scheme of distributive weights, a topic to which we now turn.
2.

Distributive Weights and other Integrated Policy-Analytic Tools

A substantial body of scholarship discusses the possibility of developing policyevaluation tools that would be sensitive to both considerations of overall well-being or
efficiency (unlike inequality or poverty measures) and distributive considerations (unlike
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cost-benefit analysis or QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis), and would incorporate
“distributive weights” or some such device to systematically structure tradeoffs between
overall well-being and equity.122 Administrative agencies in the U.S., by contrast with
agencies in some other countries, do not currently employ distributionally sensitive
policy-evaluation tools of this sort. They should consider doing so -- at least once tools
that have sufficiently low decision costs and are sufficiently transparent to agency
overseers are developed.123
The questions whether well-being should be measured on a lifetime and
sublifetime basis, and whether an ex post or ex ante perspective should be adopted, are
absolutely fundamental to designing a distributionally sensitive procedure for policy
analysis. These questions have surfaced, most clearly, in the scholarship authored by
health economists that proposes incorporating equity weights in QALY-based analysis.
Erik Nord proposes that equity weights, here, should take the form of “severity”
weights.124 The basic idea is that a change in an individual’s health should be weighted to
account for his current health condition. Providing a .1-QALY improvement to an
individual currently at QALY level .2 should count for more than providing the same
improvement to an individual currently at level .4. More generally, we can estimate an
individual’s expected QALYs in each future year, in the status quo and given some
policy intervention. The expected improvement in the individual’s QALYs in each year,
provided by the policy, should be weighted to take account of the level of expected
QALYs that the individual would otherwise receive, in the status quo.
[Imagine that] a person’s utilities in the next five years in case of non-intervention are expected to
be 0.7, .7, .6, .5, and 0.0 (dead), and the utilities would be .8 in all 5 years (and then dead) in case
of intervention …. The severity approach implies the application of severity weights . . . to each of
125
these annual utility gains.

From the perspective of lifetime, ex post, welfarism, Nord’s proposal is doubly
problematic: first, for making the distributive weight applied to a health change a
function of the annual rather than lifetime health status of the affected individual; and,
second, for applying the weights to expected changes in individuals’ expected annual
QALYs in each future year, thus implicitly adopting an “ex ante” account of
distributional sensitivity under uncertainty.
The health economist Alan Williams disagrees with the sublifetime focus of
Nord’s proposal. Williams’ suggestion, the so-called “fair innings” proposal, is that
fairness concerns the distribution of lifetime QALYs. “A powerful part of the rhetoric
122
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about equity in health care employs the notion of equality applied to people’s whole
lifetime experiences and not just to their current situation.”126 Williams proposes using
survey research to determine how much population life expectancy citizens are willing to
sacrifice for the sake of equalizing life expectancy. This research would generate
weighting factors, which would be applied to expected QALY changes depending on the
expected lifetime QALYs of those affected. From the perspective of ex post lifetime
welfarism, Williams’ proposal for equity-weighted QALY analysis is a significant
improvement over Nord’s, but it is still marred by its ex ante focus. “The fair innings
weight applied to health gains of each individual is defined as a function of his/her
present expected lifetime QALYs . . . .”127
What would a better approach be? First, at least ideally, distributively sensitive
policy analysis should consist in the application of a social welfare function. It should
consist in “SWF” analysis. This proposal is less utopian than it may seem. The SWF is
the best, systematic intellectual framework currently available for considering both the
distributional and overall-welfare impacts of policies. As already mentioned, the
scholarly literature on optimal taxation pervasively employs the SWF framework128;
much of the non-tax literature on distributive weighting draws on that framework as
well129; and there is some scholarly work that actually considers specific non-tax policy
proposals using SWFs.130 A crucial issue to be overcome, in rendering SWF analysis a
feasible and sufficiently transparent tool for government bodies, is to specify the form of
the SWF. Should it be prioritarian or comparativist? What should its parameters be? The
so-called Atkinsonian family of SWFs is perhaps most widely used by scholars, and is a
prioritarian SWF (with the degree of priority to welfare gains for worse-off individuals
captured by an inequality aversion parameter ε). 131 The rank-weighted SWF,
corresponding to the popular Gini coefficient, is a kind of comparativist SWF.132 Thus a
first stab at SWF analysis would evaluate policies using the Atkinsonian SWF (with a
range of values of ε) and the rank-weighted SWF.
Second, distributively sensitive policy analysis should consider a variety of
sources of well-being (up to the limits of feasibility, of course). QALY analysis, equityweighted or not, is problematic for these purposes because it ignores income
differences.133 A better approach would be to take account of longevity, health and
income. Each individual’s lifetime utility would be a function of his health status and his
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income in each period. In effect, this suggestion synthesizes the QALY literature on
distributive sensitivity, which focuses on health differences; and the optimal tax and costbenefit literatures, which focus on income and consumption differences. To be sure, in
deriving an individual’s lifetime utility from his health, income and longevity, we need a
utility function. The existing literature often posits a utility function based on certain
axiomatic properties (for example, declining marginal utility of income); a better
approach, one I have discussed elsewhere, would be to use survey research about wellbeing to calibrate the utility function.134
Finally -- and this is where lifetime welfarism plus the ex post perspective comes
into play -- SWF analysis should take the form of probabilistic population profile
analysis. A population profile is a set of individual life histories, consisting of a
determinate income, health, and longevity trajectory for each individual. The status quo
consists in a probability distribution over population profiles. A policy intervention
perturbs this probability distribution, changing the population profile in some states by
changing some individual(s)’ life histories. A utility function maps each life history onto
a utility. For a given SWF, be it the Atkinsonian SWF, the rank-weighted SWF, or some
other, we calculate the expectation of the SWF in the status quo, and its expectation with
the policy.
I discuss probabilistic population profile analysis at much greater length in other
work.
My aim, here, is simply to sketch the approach and to suggest that it flows
naturally from the general position argued for in this Article. If we take seriously the
thought that distributively sensitive policy analysis should consist in SWF analysis, then - given lifetime, ex post welfarism -- we should take seriously the suggestion that
probabilistic population profile analysis is the appropriate template for the SWF
approach.
135

It is possible, I suppose, that a different template is optimal. Perhaps, for
example, probabilistic population profile analysis is too computationally demanding.
Magnus Johannesson argues, along these general lines, against an ex post approach to
equity-weighted QALYs.
From the ex post perspective, the equity weights have to be applied to all possible health profiles
before they are multiplied by the probabilities of the different profiles …. If, for instance, an
individual has a 50% chance of living 20 years in full health and a 50% chance of living 40 years
in full health, the equity weights have to be applied to the 20 and 40 years, respectively, before the
equity-weighted QALYs of each health profile are multiplied by .5. This implies that it would be
much more impractical to take into account ex post equity than ex ante equity.136

Yet current policy-analysis techniques often involve extensive, probabilistic, calculations.
Consider toxic risk assessment, which relies upon complicated probabilistic models of
the different steps by which a toxin is disseminated to the population, and uses
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computationally demanding techniques such as Monte Carlo analysis to synthesize the
different models. The biggest hurdle to SWF analysis by agencies would seem to be the
normative task of specifying a particular SWF and individual utility function, not the
modeling task of estimating the possible distribution of the determinants of well-being
and applying the SWF “ex post” rather than “ex ante.” In any event, probabilistic
population profile analysis deserves serious attention. Other templates for SWF analysis
should be seen as second-best.
CONCLUSION
Should equality be evaluated from a lifetime or sublifetime perspective? I have
engaged this question within the framework of welfarism -- taking equality of well-being
as the goal of egalitarianism -- and have argued for the lifetime view, given both standard
and revisionary accounts of personal identity over time. I have also surveyed the
multiple implications of the lifetime view for law and policy: for the measurement of
equality, the measurement of poverty, the design of redistributive taxes, the question
whether non-tax instruments should be used for redistribution, and the nature of “suspect
classes” and distributively sensitive policy tools.
The reader may not share my view that welfarism and the “SWF” framework
provide insight into problems of social choice. She might prefer to ask: given some nonwell-being currency for equality (for example, “resources” or “capabilities”), should we
seek to equalize lifetime or sublifetime holdings of that currency? Or, she might be
sympathetic to welfarism but be unpersuaded by the case in favor of a lifetime view
(which, like much normative argument, is holistic rather than deductive -- there is
nothing logically flawed or flatly incoherent about the sublifetime view). But I hope the
reader does agree that the time-slice question is a vital one, not just for philosophers and
theoretical economists, but for legal scholars, applied economists, public health scholars,
and policymakers too. We cannot think seriously about how to measure and alleviate
inequality without engaging that question.
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